CVE-2022-20172
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn onbind of ShannonRcsService.java, there is a possible access to protect data due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-206987222References: N/A
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn the onBind method of ShannonRcsService.java (an Android service), a permission check is missing before returning protected data to bound clients. Any local application can potentially bind to this service without authorization and access sensitive information, as the service does not verify the caller's identity or permissions before disclosing data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if ShannonRcsService is running on the deviceUse 'adb shell dumpsys' or check running services with 'adb shell ps -A | grep -i shannon' to see if the ShannonRcsService process is active on the deviceAffected if The ShannonRcsService process is found running on the device
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Verify the service is exported and accessibleDecompile the APK containing ShannonRcsService and examine the AndroidManifest.xml declaration for this service. Look for android:exported attribute and any android:permission attributeAffected if The service has android:exported='true' with no android:permission or a very weak permission (like normal or dangerous) defined
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Inspect the onBind method for permission validationDecompile the service APK and examine the ShannonRcsService.java onBind method implementation. Look for code that verifies caller identity, checks permissions, or validates signature before returning IBinderAffected if The onBind method returns an IBinder without performing any permission check or caller verification
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Test binding to the service from an untrusted appCreate a minimal test application that attempts to bind to the ShannonRcsService using an Intent with the correct component name, and observe if the bind succeeds without holding any special permissionsAffected if The bind succeeds without requiring signature-level or privileged permissions
The device is affected if ShannonRcsService is running, exported without proper signature-level permission protection, and its onBind method lacks caller verification logic.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedAdd an appropriate permission check (e.g., signature or signature|privileged permission) in the onBind method of ShannonRcsService.java to verify the calling application's authorization before returning any data or service interfaces.
Android Security Patch Level 2022-07-01 or later
- 1. Check current Android security patch level on the device: Settings > About Phone > Security Patch Level
- 2. Ensure the device receives and installs the July 2022 Android Security Update (or later)
- 3. For devices no longer receiving official security updates, consider upgrading to a supported device model that receives regular security patches
- 4. Verify the security patch level shows July 2022 or later after update
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-20172 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-20172 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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