CVE-2022-31565
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe yogson/syrabond repository through 2020-05-25 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe yogson/syrabond repository through May 2020 contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability caused by unsafe usage of Flask's send_file function. This allows attackers to access arbitrary files on the server by specifying absolute file paths in requests, bypassing the intended web root restrictions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2020-05-25CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Syrabond is installedSearch for the Syrabond application directory or check running Python processes for 'syrabond' in the name. Look for files like syrabond.py or directories named 'syrabond' in the system.Affected if The Syrabond application is found and appears to be the yogson/syrabond project
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Check Syrabond versionReview the application source code for version information such as a version file, setup.py, __version__ variable, or commit history timestamps. Compare against the May 2020 cutoff date.Affected if The installed version is from May 2020 or earlier (commit date <= 2020-05-25)
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Locate Flask send_file usage in source codeSearch the codebase for patterns like 'send_file(' to identify all usages of Flask's send_file function. Review the file paths passed to this function.Affected if The code contains send_file() calls that accept file paths without proper path validation
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Identify if user input reaches send_fileExamine the send_file calls found and trace whether request parameters (query strings, form data, URL parameters) are used as file path arguments to send_file without sanitization.Affected if Request parameters or user-controllable data are passed directly to send_file without validation or use of send_from_directory
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Check if vulnerable endpoints are accessibleIdentify the route handlers containing the unsafe send_file usage. Determine if these routes are exposed (not behind authentication or firewall).Affected if The route using unsafe send_file is accessible without authentication or other access controls
The environment is affected if running Syrabond from May 2020 or earlier with accessible endpoints that use Flask's send_file to serve files based on user-supplied paths.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace unsafe send_file calls with Flask's send_from_directory function or implement proper path validation using os.path.join with a trusted base directory to ensure all file paths remain within the allowed directory.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-31565 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-31565 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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