ShiroApplication · Apache
CVE-2022-32532
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedApache Shiro before 1.9.1, A RegexRequestMatcher can be misconfigured to be bypassed on some servlet containers. Applications using RegExPatternMatcher with `.` in the regular expression are possibly vulnerable to an authorization bypass.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache Shiro before 1.9.1 contains a RegexRequestMatcher authorization bypass vulnerability. When using RegExPatternMatcher with an unescaped `.` in the regex pattern, the matcher may be bypassed on certain servlet containers because `.` matches any character in regex, potentially allowing unauthorized access to protected resources.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
ShiroApplication
< 1.9.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Apache Shiro versionLocate the Shiro library JAR file in your application (typically named shiro-core-[version].jar) or check your build configuration (pom.xml, build.gradle) for the Shiro dependency version.Affected if The installed version is before 1.9.1 (for example, 1.9.0, 1.8.0, 1.7.1, etc.)
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Find RegexRequestMatcher usageSearch your codebase for bean definitions or configuration files containing 'RegexRequestMatcher'. Check XML configuration files (such as shiro.ini, shiro-config.xml), Java configuration classes, or YAML/properties files where filter chains are defined.Affected if RegexRequestMatcher is configured and used in your filter chain definitions
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Examine regex patterns for unescaped dotsFor each RegexRequestMatcher configuration found, inspect the pattern attribute. Look for literal dot characters in the regex that are NOT preceded by a backslash (such as in patterns like '.*admin.*' or '/user/.*').Affected if Any regex pattern contains unescaped '.' characters that could match any character including path separators or special characters
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Verify the matcher is applied to protected resourcesReview the filter chain order in your Shiro configuration to confirm the RegexRequestMatcher with the problematic pattern is applied to URLs requiring authentication or authorization.Affected if The vulnerable regex pattern is applied to protect sensitive endpoints or resources
You are affected if your Shiro version is before 1.9.1 AND you use RegexRequestMatcher with unescaped dots in patterns protecting sensitive resources.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.9.1
Upgrade Apache Shiro to version 1.9.1 or later. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, audit all RegexRequestMatcher configurations and escape or remove unescaped `.` characters in regex patterns.
1.9.1
- Identify all pom.xml, build.gradle, or other dependency management files that specify Apache Shiro
- Update the Shiro dependency version from any version below 1.9.1 to 1.9.1 or later
- Rebuild the application with the updated dependency
- Redeploy the application to all affected environments
- Verify that RegexRequestMatcher authorization rules with `.` in the regex pattern are now properly enforced
- Test that the authorization bypass is no longer reproducible
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Shiro
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,504.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-32532 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-32532 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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