CVE-2022-33265
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMemory corruption due to information exposure in Powerline Communication Firmware while sending different MMEs from a single, unassociated device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA memory corruption vulnerability in Powerline Communication firmware allows an unassociated attacker to send specially crafted MAC Management Messages (MMEs), causing memory corruption and information exposure. The flaw requires no authentication or prior association with the PLC network.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify PLC hardware modelLocate the Powerline Communication device on your network and retrieve its model number. Common identifiers include checking the device label, SNMP inventory, or network discovery tools that list device hardware details.Affected if The device model contains Qualcomm QCA7500, QCA7520, or QCA7550 chipset identifiers.
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Confirm PLC firmware versionAccess the PLC device management interface (web UI, CLI, or SNMP) and retrieve the installed firmware version. For command-line access, commands like 'show version' or SNMP OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1 may expose firmware details.Affected if The device runs any firmware version on Qualcomm QCA7500, QCA7520, or QCA7550 hardware (all versions are affected).
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Verify PLC network exposureReview network segmentation configurations to determine if the PLC network segment is isolated from untrusted/external networks. Check firewall rules, VLAN assignments, and access control lists governing PLC device connectivity.Affected if The PLC network interface is directly accessible from untrusted network segments or has no firewall/ACL protection between it and external networks.
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Inspect for anomalous MME trafficCapture network traffic on the PLC network segment using a sniffer or SIEM tool. Filter for MAC Management Messages (MMEs) - look for unexpected or malformed MME frames originating from unassociated MAC addresses. Use display filters such as 'wlan.fc.type == 0' or PLC-specific MME selectors if available.Affected if MME traffic is observed from MAC addresses not previously associated with legitimate PLC network nodes, or MME frames contain unexpected/corrupted payload data.
You are affected if your network contains any Qualcomm QCA7500, QCA7520, or QCA7550 PLC devices and those devices are accessible from untrusted network segments or exhibit anomalous MME traffic from unknown sources.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied firmware patches when available; implement network segmentation to isolate PLC infrastructure from untrusted networks; monitor for anomalous MME traffic from unknown sources.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,320.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-33265 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-33265 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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