CVE-2022-3924
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThis issue can affect BIND 9 resolvers with `stale-answer-enable yes;` that also make use of the option `stale-answer-client-timeout`, configured with a value greater than zero. If the resolver receives many queries that require recursion, there will be a corresponding increase in the number of clients that are waiting for recursion to complete. If there are sufficient clients already waiting when a new client query is received so that it is necessary to SERVFAIL the longest waiting client (see BIND 9 ARM `recursive-clients` limit and soft quota), then it is possible for a race to occur between providing a stale answer to this older client and sending an early timeout SERVFAIL, which may cause an assertion failure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.12 through 9.16.36, 9.18.0 through 9.18.10, 9.19.0 through 9.19.8, and 9.16.12-S1 through 9.16.36-S1.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA race condition in BIND 9 resolvers with `stale-answer-enable yes` and `stale-answer-client-timeout` greater than zero can cause an assertion failure when a SERVFAIL is sent to the longest-waiting client while simultaneously providing a stale answer, leading to denial of service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 9.16.12, < 9.16.37>= 9.18.0, < 9.18.11>= 9.19.0, < 9.19.9= 9.16.12= 9.16.13= 9.16.14= 9.16.21= 9.16.32= 9.16.36CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed BIND versionRun `named -v` or `named -V` to see the BIND version numberAffected if The version falls within the affected ranges: 9.16.12 to 9.16.36, 9.18.0 to 9.18.10, or 9.19.0 to 9.19.8
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Verify stale-answer-enable configurationInspect the named.conf file (commonly /etc/named.conf or /etc/bind/named.conf) and search for `stale-answer-enable`Affected if The option is set to `yes` or `true`
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Verify stale-answer-client-timeout settingIn the same named.conf file, search for `stale-answer-client-timeout` and note its numeric valueAffected if The value is set to a number greater than 0 (zero)
The environment is affected only if running a vulnerable BIND 9 version AND both stale-answer-enable is enabled AND stale-answer-client-timeout is set to a value greater than zero.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped9.16.379.18.119.19.9
Upgrade BIND 9 to version 9.16.37, 9.18.11, or 9.19.9 or later, or disable the `stale-answer-client-timeout` option by setting it to 0.
Upgrade to BIND 9.16.37+, 9.18.11+, or 9.19.9+ depending on your release branch
- 1. Identify the current BIND 9 version by running `named -v` or `bind -v`
- 2. Determine which release series you are running (9.16.x, 9.18.x, or 9.19.x)
- 3. For BIND 9.16.x: Upgrade to version 9.16.37 or later
- 4. For BIND 9.18.x: Upgrade to version 9.18.11 or later
- 5. For BIND 9.19.x: Upgrade to version 9.19.9 or later
- 6. After upgrade, verify the fix by checking `named -v` shows the patched version
- 7. Test DNS resolution functionality to confirm the resolver operates correctly
- 8. If immediate upgrade is not possible, mitigate by setting `stale-answer-client-timeout 0;` in the options block of named.conf (this disables the vulnerable code path)
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-3924 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-3924 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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