Build PublisherApplication · Jenkins

CVE-2022-41232

HIGH · 8.0 CVSS v3.1 Published 2022-09-21
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 1.22 or later.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Jenkins Build-Publisher Plugin 1.22 and earlier allows attackers to replace any config.xml file on the Jenkins controller file system with an empty file by providing a crafted file name to an API endpoint.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A CSRF vulnerability in Jenkins Build-Publisher Plugin 1.22 and earlier allows attackers to replace any config.xml file on the Jenkins controller filesystem with an empty file by providing a crafted filename to an API endpoint, enabling denial of service or configuration disruption.

MitigationUpdate to Build-Publisher Plugin version 1.23 or later which includes CSRF protection (crumb) validation. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict API access via network controls.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Build PublisherApplication
Affected:<= 1.22

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify Build-Publisher Plugin is installed
    Navigate to Jenkins > Manage Jenkins > Manage Plugins > Installed tab and search for 'Build Publisher' or 'build-publisher' in the plugin list.
    Affected if Build Publisher plugin appears in the installed plugins list.
  2. Check installed Build-Publisher version
    In the Installed Plugins tab, locate the Build Publisher entry and note the Version column. Compare this version number against the affected range: any version 1.22 or earlier is vulnerable.
    Affected if The installed version is 1.22 or lower.
  3. Confirm API endpoint accessibility
    Check if the Build-Publisher API endpoint is exposed. This typically involves accessing a URL pattern such as /plugin/build-publisher/ or checking network exposure of the Jenkins API. Verify through Jenkins > Manage Jenkins > Configure Global Security what permissions are granted to anonymous or unauthenticated users for the API.
    Affected if The plugin API is accessible to unauthenticated or low-privilege users without additional authentication or network restrictions.
  4. Verify CSRF protection status
    Navigate to Jenkins > Manage Jenkins > Configure Global Security and locate the 'CSRF Protection' section. Confirm whethercrumb validation is enabled globally. Note: The fix in version 1.23 adds crumb validation specifically to the plugin's API endpoint.
    Affected if CSRF protection is disabled globally, or the Build-Publisher plugin API does not enforce crumb validation (version 1.22 or earlier).

You are affected if the Build-Publisher plugin is installed at version 1.22 or earlier and its API endpoint is accessible to attackers who could replace config.xml files.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 1.22
Interim mitigation

Update to Build-Publisher Plugin version 1.23 or later which includes CSRF protection (crumb) validation. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict API access via network controls.

Fix this in Build Publisher Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,200
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-41232 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-41232 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data