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Deserialization of Untrusted DataWeakness · CWE-502

CVE-2022-45147

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-07-09
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
81/100
Remediation priority · High
No privileges

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC PCS neo V4.0 (All versions), SIMATIC STEP 7 V16 (All versions), SIMATIC STEP 7 V17 (All versions), SIMATIC STEP 7 V18 (All versions < V18 Update 2). Affected applications do not properly restrict the .NET BinaryFormatter when deserializing user-controllable input. This could allow an attacker to cause a type confusion and execute arbitrary code within the affected application. This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The vulnerability exists in SIMATIC PCS neo V4.0 and STEP 7 V16-V18 where affected applications use .NET BinaryFormatter to deserialize user-controllable input without proper restrictions. BinaryFormatter is notoriously insecure because it can deserialize arbitrary types, allowing attackers to inject malicious payloads that trigger type confusion and achieve arbitrary code execution on the target system.

MitigationReplace BinaryFormatter with a secure serializer such as System.Text.Json, XmlSerializer, or DataContractSerializer, or implement a custom SerializationBinder that restricts allowed types. If BinaryFormatter must be used, implement strict allow-lists for deserializable types.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify installed product and version
    Locate the installed SIMATIC PCS neo or STEP 7 installation and check the version (typically via Add/Remove Programs, or the installation directory contains version info)
    Affected if Version is SIMATIC PCS neo V4.0 or STEP 7 V16, V17, or V18
  2. Search for BinaryFormatter usage in application binaries
    Use a tool like ILSpy, dnSpy, or strings to inspect .NET assemblies in the application installation directory for references to System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter or the BinaryFormatter class
    Affected if BinaryFormatter class is found in the application's code
  3. Identify deserialization entry points
    Search the application binaries or configuration files for methods that accept serialized input (such as Deserialize, ReadObject, or custom deserialization handlers) and trace whether they use BinaryFormatter
    Affected if Code paths exist that call BinaryFormatter.Deserialize() on data from untrusted sources
  4. Check for custom SerializationBinder
    Inspect the application assemblies for implementations of ISerializationBinder or SerializationBinder that restrict allowed types
    Affected if No custom SerializationBinder is implemented, or the allow-list does not restrict BinaryFormatter deserialization
  5. Identify data sources for deserialized input
    Review application configuration, network listeners, file imports, or user-upload features to determine if BinaryFormatter-receiving inputs originate from untrusted sources (network, file upload, user input)
    Affected if Deserialized data can come from network packets, file imports, or user-controllable sources without validation

User is affected if running SIMATIC PCS neo V4.0 or STEP 7 V16-V18 and the application uses BinaryFormatter to deserialize data from untrusted or user-controllable sources without a custom SerializationBinder allow-list.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace BinaryFormatter with a secure serializer such as System.Text.Json, XmlSerializer, or DataContractSerializer, or implement a custom SerializationBinder that restricts allowed types. If BinaryFormatter must be used, implement strict allow-lists for deserializable types.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
24.0 hours of engineering $4,200
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-45147 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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