CVE-2023-0035
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedsoftbus_client_stub in communication subsystem within OpenHarmony-v3.0.5 and prior versions has an authentication bypass vulnerability which allows an "SA relay attack".Local attackers can bypass authentication and attack other SAs with high privilege.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe softbus_client_stub component in OpenHarmony's communication subsystem contains an authentication bypass vulnerability allowing local attackers to perform an SA relay attack. This enables privilege escalation by relaying authentication credentials to impersonate high-privilege System Abilities (SAs), bypassing the normal authentication checks in the inter-process communication pathway.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 3.0, <= 3.0.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify OpenHarmony versionRun 'paramget' or check /system/etc/param/VERSION file to retrieve the installed OpenHarmony version numberAffected if The installed version is between 3.0 and 3.0.5 inclusive (>= 3.0.0 and <= 3.0.5)
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Locate softbus_client_stub componentSearch for the softbus_client_stub binary or library in /system/lib or /system/bin directories using 'find' command: find /system -name '*softbus*'Affected if The softbus_client_stub component exists in the system, indicating the vulnerable component is present
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Inspect communication subsystem IPC configurationCheck the communication subsystem configuration files in /etc/softbus/ or /system/etc/softbus/ for IPC authentication settingsAffected if The IPC authentication validation for System Abilities is disabled or missing in the softbus configuration files
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Verify SA (System Ability) permission settingsExamine the SA permission configuration in /etc/hwperm/ or /system/etc/hwperm/ directories to identify any high-privilege SAs that may be susceptible to relay attacksAffected if High-privilege SAs are configured to accept relayed authentication without additional local verification
A system is affected if it runs OpenHarmony version 3.0 through 3.0.5 and has the softbus_client_stub component present, enabling a local attacker to perform SA relay attacks for privilege escalation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the vendor patch for OpenHarmony v3.0.5 or later if available. If no patch exists, consider implementing additional authentication validation layers or network segmentation to limit local attack surface until a fix is deployed.
OpenHarmony 3.1 or later (3.2 LTS recommended)
- 1. Identify current OpenHarmony version in your deployment using system version checking tools
- 2. Review OpenHarmony release notes from version 3.1 and later to confirm CVE-2023-0035 is addressed
- 3. Plan upgrade to the latest stable OpenHarmony release (recommended 3.2 LTS or later)
- 4. Test upgrade in a non-production environment before deploying to production
- 5. After upgrade, verify that the softbus_client_stub authentication bypass is no longer present
- 6. Monitor for any abnormal SA (System Ability) communication behavior post-upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $11,072.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-0035 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-0035 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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