CVE-2023-0036
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedplatform_callback_stub in misc subsystem within OpenHarmony-v3.0.5 and prior versions has an authentication bypass vulnerability which allows an "SA relay attack".Local attackers can bypass authentication and attack other SAs with high privilege.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe platform_callback_stub in OpenHarmony's misc subsystem contains an authentication bypass vulnerability where local attackers can exploit an SA (System Ability) relay attack to bypass authentication and target high-privilege System Abilities. This is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the IPC mechanism between SAs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 3.0, <= 3.0.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check OpenHarmony versionRun 'getprop ro.build.version.sdk' or check system property 'hw_sc.build.platform.version' to retrieve the OpenHarmony platform versionAffected if Version is between 3.0 and 3.0.5 inclusive
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Identify platform_callback_stub presenceSearch for the platform_callback_stub binary or service in /system/bin or /vendor/bin directories using 'find' or 'ls' commandsAffected if The platform_callback_stub binary exists and is running as a system service
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Verify System Ability configurationCheck SA registry configuration files in /etc or /system/etc for registered System Abilities, looking for high-privilege SAs that use IPCAffected if High-privilege SAs (such as system ability IDs with privileged access) are registered and accessible via IPC
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Test IPC authentication mechanismUse hdc or debugging tools to attempt a relay attack probe against the callback stub interface - inspect whether authentication tokens are properly validatedAffected if The platform_callback_stub accepts IPC requests without requiring proper SA-level authentication verification
If running OpenHarmony 3.0.x and the platform_callback_stub service is active with exposed high-privilege System Abilities, the environment is vulnerable to this authentication bypass.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor patches for OpenHarmony v3.0.5 and prior versions to remediate the authentication bypass in platform_callback_stub. Restrict local access to minimize attack surface.
OpenHarmony version > 3.0.5 (e.g., 3.0.6 or 3.1.x - verify specific fixed version in official release notes)
- 1. Identify the current OpenHarmony version in your environment to confirm it is within the affected range (3.0.x through 3.0.5)
- 2. Consult the official OpenHarmony release notes or security advisories on gitee.com to identify the first fixed release version
- 3. Plan and schedule an upgrade to a version newer than 3.0.5 that includes the platform_callback_stub authentication fix
- 4. After upgrading, verify that the platform_callback_stub component has been updated and the SA relay attack vector is closed
- 5. Test the fix in a staging environment before deploying to production
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-0036 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-0036 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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