CVE-2023-20016
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the backup configuration feature of Cisco UCS Manager Software and in the configuration export feature of Cisco FXOS Software could allow an unauthenticated attacker with access to a backup file to decrypt sensitive information stored in the full state and configuration backup files. This vulnerability is due to a weakness in the encryption method used for the backup function. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by leveraging a static key used for the backup configuration feature. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to decrypt sensitive information that is stored in full state and configuration backup files, such as local user credentials, authentication server passwords, Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) community names, and other credentials.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability in Cisco UCS Manager and FXOS software stems from a static encryption key used in the backup configuration feature. An attacker with access to a backup file can decrypt it to extract sensitive credentials including local user passwords, authentication server passwords, and SNMP community strings.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 4.2\(3c\)all versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify product model and software versionAccess the Cisco UCS Manager interface or use CLI command 'show version' to determine the exact model (e.g., UCS 6536, UCS 6454) and firmware/software version installedAffected if The product model matches one listed in affected products AND the version is below the fixed release (for UCS Central: < 4.2(3c), or for hardware models: all versions listed are affected)
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Locate backup configuration filesSearch for backup files in the UCS backup storage location. In UCS Manager, check /etc/svc备份 or the configured backup export path. Use CLI: 'show backup' or review the backup configuration with 'show running-config | include backup'Affected if Any backup configuration files (.xml, .bak, or export files) exist on the system, as these contain the encrypted credentials that could be decrypted
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Verify backup file permissionsCheck file permissions on backup files and directories using 'ls -la' or equivalent. Verify which user accounts and groups have read access to backup storage locationsAffected if Backup files are readable by unauthorized users or stored in locations with weak access controls (world-readable, group-readable by non-admin groups)
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Review backup export configurationInspect the backup configuration settings via UCS Manager GUI under Admin tab > Backup & Export, or via CLI 'show running-config | include backup' to see backup destination and scheduleAffected if Remote backup export is configured (e.g., to FTP, SCP, SFTP server) as this creates transferable files that could be intercepted
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Audit recent backup creation eventsReview system logs for backup creation events. In UCS Manager, check the Audit Log or use 'show logging' for backup-related entries to determine if backups are actively being createdAffected if Regular backups are being performed, generating backup files that contain encrypted sensitive credentials
You are affected if you run any of the listed product models with the specified versions AND you use the backup configuration feature, as the static encryption key allows decryption of any accessible backup file.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data4.2
Apply Cisco vendor patches when available, rotate all credentials that may have been stored in backups, and implement strict access controls on backup files to prevent unauthorized access.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-20016 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-20016 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data