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AndroidOperating system · Google

CVE-2023-21149

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2023-06-28
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
In registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver of ShannonRcsService.java, there is a possible way to activate/deactivate RCS service due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-270050709References: N/A

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

In the ShannonRCS service on Android, the registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver method lacks a permission check, allowing any local application to send intents that can activate or deactivate the RCS service without authorization. This constitutes a local privilege escalation as the component incorrectly trusts incoming intents without validating the caller's permissions.

MitigationAdd a signature-level or system-level permission check (e.g., via enforceCallingOrSelfPermission) to the intent receiver in registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver to ensure only authorized system components can control RCS service activation.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
AndroidOperating system
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify ShannonRCS service presence
    Check if the ShannonRCS service is installed on the device by examining system services: run 'dumpsys -l' or check /system/app/ for RCS-related packages. The service name typically includes 'ShannonRCS' or 'RCS' in the package or service listing.
    Affected if The ShannonRCS service is present on the device (this component exists primarily on Samsung and some other Android devices with Shannon modems).
  2. Verify intent receiver permission requirement
    Examine the AndroidManifest.xml or decompile the ShannonRCS APK to inspect the intent receiver registration for registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver. Look for android:permission attributes on the receiver declaration.
    Affected if The intent receiver declares no permission requirement (android:permission is missing or empty) or only declares a low-level permission like android.permission.INTERNET.
  3. Check for enforceCallingOrSelfPermission in code
    Decompile the ShannonRCS service APK and inspect the registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver method implementation. Search for calls to enforceCallingPermission, enforceCallingOrSelfPermission, or checkCallingPermission methods.
    Affected if The method contains no permission enforcement calls - the code directly processes incoming intents without validating the caller's permissions.
  4. Test intent receiver accessibility
    Create a minimal test app that sends an intent with action 'com.samsung.rcs.register_gsma_service' or similar RCS activation intents to the ShannonRCS service component and observe if the system accepts and processes it.
    Affected if The intent is accepted and triggers RCS service state changes without the system returning a SecurityException - indicating any local app can control the service.

A device is affected if the ShannonRCS service is present and the registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver component lacks signature-level or system permission enforcement, allowing any installed application to activate or deactivate RCS without authorization.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Add a signature-level or system-level permission check (e.g., via enforceCallingOrSelfPermission) to the intent receiver in registerGsmaServiceIntentReceiver to ensure only authorized system components can control RCS service activation.

Fix this in Android Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,080
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-21149 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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