CVE-2023-23770
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMotorola MBTS Site Controller accepts hard-coded backdoor password. The Motorola MBTS Site Controller Man Machine Interface (MMI), allowing for service technicians to diagnose and configure the device, accepts a hard-coded backdoor password that cannot be changed or disabled.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Motorola MBTS Site Controller's Man Machine Interface (MMI), used by service technicians for device diagnostics and configuration, contains a hard-coded backdoor password that cannot be changed or disabled by administrators. This provides unauthenticated access to the device's full management functions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= r05.32.58CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelAccess the device's web interface, command-line interface, or SNMP banner and look for 'Motorola MBTS Site Controller' or 'MMI' identification stringsAffected if The device is NOT a Motorola MBTS Site Controller - if different, this CVE does not apply
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Check the firmware versionAccess the MMI diagnostic interface via its web UI or CLI and navigate to the firmware version or system information section, or query via SNMP if availableAffected if The firmware version is NOT exactly r05.32.58 - only this exact version is affected per the advisory
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Determine MMI interface accessibilityScan network for open ports associated with the MMI interface (typically HTTP/HTTPS on web ports, or check device documentation for MMI service ports). Verify if the interface is reachable from your network segments.Affected if The MMI interface is not network-accessible at all (not exposed) - the backdoor cannot be exploited if the interface cannot be reached
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Assess network exposure of MMI serviceReview firewall rules, ACLs, and network segmentation around the device. Check if the MMI interface is accessible from untrusted network segments or the internet.Affected if The MMI interface is directly exposed to untrusted networks or the internet without restrictive access controls
You are affected if you have a Motorola MBTS Site Controller running exactly firmware r05.32.58 with its MMI interface accessible from your network
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince the password cannot be changed or disabled, apply network segmentation to isolate the MMI interface from untrusted networks and implement strict firewall rules to limit access to authorized IP addresses only. Contact Motorola for available firmware updates.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-23770 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-23770 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data