CVE-2023-24012
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn attacker can arbitrarily craft malicious DDS Participants (or ROS 2 Nodes) with valid certificates to compromise and get full control of the attacked secure DDS databus system by exploiting vulnerable attributes in the configuration of PKCS#7 certificate’s validation. This is caused by a non-compliant implementation of permission document verification used by some DDS vendors. Specifically, an improper use of the OpenSSL PKCS7_verify function used to validate S/MIME signatures.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis vulnerability allows attackers with valid certificates to bypass permission document verification in secure DDS systems by exploiting improper PKCS#7 certificate validation in OpenSSL's PKCS7_verify function. This enables malicious DDS Participants or ROS 2 Nodes to join the secure databus and gain full control of the system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if secure DDS or ROS 2 is installedLocate DDS middleware (e.g., Fast DDS, Cyclone DDS, OpenSplice) or ROS 2 installation on the system. Check for packages or binaries related to DDS-Security or rmw_implementation.Affected if The system runs any secure DDS or ROS 2 middleware implementation that supports DDS-Security plugins.
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Determine if DDS-Security is enabledExamine the DDS domain participant configuration XML files (often in /opt or user config directories) for <security> tag with <plugin> element set to 'builtin' or 'dds_security'. For ROS 2, check the RMW_IMPLEMENTATION environment variable and launch files for security-enabled middleware.Affected if DDS-Security plugins or secure ROS 2 middleware is enabled and configured.
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Locate permission document filesSearch for permission.xml or permission.p7s files in the DDS/ROS 2 configuration directories. These files define which participants/nodes are allowed to communicate and contain the PKCS#7 signed permission grants.Affected if Permission documents signed with PKCS#7/S/MIME signatures are used for authentication.
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Inspect the permission validation implementationReview the source code or binary configuration of the DDS-Security authentication plugin to determine if it uses OpenSSL's PKCS7_verify function for validating permission documents. Check for any custom or vendor-specific security plugin implementations.Affected if The permission verification relies on OpenSSL's PKCS7_verify without additional signature validation beyond what PKCS7 provides.
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Verify certificate chain validation behaviorTest or inspect whether the authentication plugin accepts valid certificates signed by a trusted CA without performing additional S/MIME signature verification on the permission document content itself.Affected if The system accepts valid participant/node certificates but does not thoroughly validate the permission document signature beyond basic PKCS7 verification.
A user is affected if they run secure DDS or ROS 2 with DDS-Security enabled and permission documents validated via PKCS7_verify, where an attacker with a valid certificate can bypass permission checks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate affected DDS vendor implementations to use proper PKCS#7 verification with correct trust chain validation, and ensure permission documents are strictly validated against expected governance policies before granting access.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-24012 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-24012 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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