CVE-2023-25188
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. If/when CSP (as a BTS administrator) removes security hardenings from the Nokia Single RAN BTS baseband unit, the BTS baseband unit diagnostic tool AaShell (which is by default disabled) allows unauthenticated access from the mobile network solution internal BTS management network to the BTS embedded Linux operating-system level.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vulnerability exists in the AaShell diagnostic tool on Nokia Airscale ASIKA Single RAN BTS baseband units. When a CSP administrator removes security hardenings from the BTS baseband unit, the disabled-by-default AaShell tool becomes accessible without authentication from the mobile network's internal BTS management network, providing unauthenticated root-level access to the embedded Linux operating system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 19b= 20a= 20b= 20c= 21aCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed Airscale firmware versionRetrieve the firmware version from the BTS baseband unit management interface or system diagnostics. This is typically available through the Nokia Airspan management system or via CLI access to the baseband unit.Affected if The installed firmware version is 19b, 20a, 20b, 20c, or 21a
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Verify whether security hardenings have been removedReview the BTS baseband unit security configuration through the management interface or by checking the security hardening status. Look for any indicators that default security hardenings have been disabled or removed.Affected if Security hardenings have been removed from the BTS baseband unit configuration
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Confirm whether AaShell diagnostic tool is enabledCheck the AaShell tool configuration settings on the baseband unit. Determine if the disabled-by-default AaShell has been explicitly enabled by an administrator.Affected if AaShell diagnostic tool is enabled on the BTS baseband unit
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Assess network accessibility of AaShellEvaluate network access controls on the BTS management network. Determine whether the internal BTS management network is accessible from untrusted systems or external networks.Affected if The BTS management network where AaShell resides is reachable from untrusted or non-administrative systems
You are affected if your Airscale firmware is version 19b, 20a, 20b, 20c, or 21a AND security hardenings have been removed AND AaShell has been enabled AND the BTS management network is accessible from untrusted systems, allowing unauthenticated root access.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedDo not remove security hardenings from the BTS baseband unit. If hardenings must be removed for operational reasons, ensure AaShell remains disabled and implement network segmentation to restrict BTS management network access to trusted administrative systems only.
21B or later
- Contact Nokia support or access the Nokia Airscale customer portal to obtain the firmware version 21B or later
- Schedule a maintenance window as firmware upgrades on BTS equipment may cause temporary service disruption
- Review Nokia's official upgrade documentation for Airscale Asika Single RAN devices
- Download the firmware upgrade package for version 21B or later
- Follow Nokia's standard firmware upgrade procedure, which typically includes: backing up current configuration, uploading the new firmware to the BTS baseband unit, verifying the upgrade package integrity, and executing the upgrade through the Nokia BTS management interface
- After upgrade, verify that AaShell diagnostic tool remains disabled by default and that security hardenings are properly configured
- Confirm the BTS is operational and all services are restored after the upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-25188 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-25188 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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