AuthentikApplication · Goauthentik

CVE-2023-26481

MEDIUM · 6.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2023-03-04
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 2022.12.3 or later.
See remediation →
72/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Due to an insufficient access check, a recovery flow link that is created by an admin (or sent via email by an admin) can be used to set the password for any arbitrary user. This attack is only possible if a recovery flow exists, which has both an Identification and an Email stage bound to it. If the flow has policies on the identification stage to skip it when the flow is restored (by checking `request.context['is_restored']`), the flow is not affected by this. With this flow in place, an administrator must create a recovery Link or send a recovery URL to the attacker, who can, due to the improper validation of the token create, set the password for any account. Regardless, for custom recovery flows it is recommended to add a policy that checks if the flow is restored, and skips the identification stage. This issue has been fixed in versions 2023.2.3, 2023.1.3 and 2022.12.2.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

In authentik, an insufficient access check in the recovery flow token creation allows an attacker with a valid recovery link (created by an admin) to set passwords for any arbitrary user account. The vulnerability only affects recovery flows containing both Identification and Email stages that lack policies to skip identification when the flow is restored (checking `request.context['is_restored']`).

MitigationUpgrade to versions 2023.2.3, 2023.1.3, or 2022.12.2, OR add a policy to recovery flows that checks if the flow is restored and skips the identification stage.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
AuthentikApplication
Affected:< 2022.12.3> 2023.1.0, <= 2023.1.3> 2023.2.0, <= 2023.2.3

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check authentik version
    Identify the installed authentik version (typically via the admin UI footer, version endpoint, or container image tag) and compare it against the affected ranges: < 2022.12.3, > 2023.1.0 through 2023.1.3, and > 2023.2.0 through 2023.2.3
    Affected if the installed version falls within any of the affected ranges (< 2022.12.3, 2023.1.0-2023.1.3, or 2023.2.0-2023.2.3)
  2. Identify recovery flows
    In the authentik admin interface, navigate to Flows > Flows and locate any flows with purpose set to Recovery
    Affected if one or more recovery flows exist in the environment
  3. Verify recovery flow contains Identification stage
    Open each identified recovery flow and inspect its stages to confirm it includes an Identification stage component
    Affected if a recovery flow contains an Identification stage
  4. Verify recovery flow contains Email stage
    Open each identified recovery flow and inspect its stages to confirm it includes an Email stage component
    Affected if a recovery flow contains an Email stage
  5. Check for is_restored policy on Identification stage
    Open the recovery flow's Identification stage bindings and look for any policy that checks request.context['is_restored'] to skip that stage when the flow is restored
    Affected if the recovery flow has BOTH Identification and Email stages BUT lacks a policy that skips the Identification stage when request.context['is_restored'] is true

The environment is affected if the installed authentik version is in the vulnerable range AND there exists a recovery flow containing both Identification and Email stages without a policy to skip identification when the flow is restored.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 2022.12.3 or later
Fixed in 2022.12.3
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to versions 2023.2.3, 2023.1.3, or 2022.12.2, OR add a policy to recovery flows that checks if the flow is restored and skips the identification stage.

Recommended fix High confidence

Upgrade to the latest version in your current branch: 2022.12.4+, 2023.1.4+, or 2023.2.4+ (prefer latest available)

  1. 1. Identify the currently running Authentik version by checking the version endpoint or container/tag information
  2. 2. Determine which version branch you are on (2022.12.x, 2023.1.x, or 2023.2.x)
  3. 3. For 2022.12.x branch: Upgrade to version 2022.12.4 or latest 2022.12 release
  4. 4. For 2023.1.x branch: Upgrade to version 2023.1.4 or latest 2023.1 release
  5. 5. For 2023.2.x branch: Upgrade to version 2023.2.4 or latest 2023.2 release
  6. 6. If using a custom recovery flow, add a policy that checks `request.context['is_restored']` and skips the identification stage when true
  7. 7. After upgrade, verify the recovery flow still works correctly by testing password reset functionality
  8. 8. Review all admin-created recovery links and invalidate any that may have been shared inappropriately
Caveat Standard upgrade considerations apply - review release notes for any breaking changes between minor versions; test in staging before production deployment

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Authentik Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
14.0 hours of engineering $2,490
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-26481 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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