CVE-2023-31759
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedWeak Security in the 433MHz keyfob of Kerui W18 Alarm System v1.0 allows attackers to gain full access via a code replay attack.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Kerui W18 Alarm System v1.0 uses a 433MHz keyfob with a static or predictable code mechanism that can be captured and replayed to achieve full system access. This code replay attack exploits the lack of rolling code or challenge-response authentication in the RF communication protocol between the keyfob and alarm panel.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Kerui W18 model and firmware versionLocate the device identification label or check system settings for firmware version. Verify the model is Kerui W18 and firmware is version 1.0.Affected if The device is a Kerui W18 alarm system running firmware version 1.0.
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Verify 433MHz keyfob is in useIdentify the remote controls paired with the alarm panel. Confirm they operate on 433MHz RF frequency as documented in the product specifications.Affected if The system uses 433MHz keyfobs for remote control.
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Inspect RF communication protocolUse an SDR (software-defined radio) like RTL-SDR or HackRF to capture and analyze the RF signals transmitted when pressing keyfob buttons. Examine if the transmitted codes change with each press or remain identical.Affected if The keyfob transmits identical codes on each button press (static codes) rather than changing codes.
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Check for rolling code implementationCapture multiple button presses over time and compare the transmitted code sequences. Document whether codes repeat predictably or follow a pattern. Review any available product documentation regarding security mechanisms.Affected if The RF protocol lacks rolling code (hopping code) or challenge-response authentication, allowing captured codes to be replayed successfully.
A user is affected if they use a Kerui W18 v1.0 system with 433MHz keyfobs that transmit static/reusable codes without rolling code or challenge-response authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedReplace static codes with rolling code (hopping code) implementation using cryptographic primitives to ensure each button press generates a unique, non-reusable code that cannot be replayed. Consider hardware update if current keyfob MCU lacks capacity for secure rolling code generation.
- Replace the Kerui W18 alarm system with a model that uses rolling code technology (e.g., 433MHz rolling code keyfobs or newer encrypted wireless protocols like Z-Wave, Zigbee, or Wi-Fi with TLS).
- If replacement is not immediately feasible, implement physical security controls such as additional locks, security cameras, and motion sensors to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access.
- Consider adding secondary authentication mechanisms (e.g., PIN code panels, mobile app notifications with disarming codes) to complement the keyfob.
- Monitor the premises more frequently or employ security personnel to detect unauthorized entry attempts.
- Audit the property regularly for any suspicious activity around the alarm system and keyfob storage.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-31759 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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