CVE-2023-32194
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been identified when granting a create or * global role for a resource type of "namespaces"; no matter the API group, the subject will receive * permissions for core namespaces. This can lead to someone being capable of accessing, creating, updating, or deleting a namespace in the project.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis is an authorization bypass vulnerability in the RBAC system where granting a create or wildcard (*) global role for the 'namespaces' resource type inadvertently grants full (*) permissions to core namespaces regardless of the API group. This allows subjects with limited role grants to access, create, update, or delete namespaces they should not have full control over.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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List global cluster roles that grant namespace permissionsQuery the RBAC system for all cluster roles or global roles that include the 'namespaces' resource type in their permissions. Look for rules that specify 'namespaces' as the resource with 'create' or '*' (wildcard) verbs.Affected if A global/cluster role grants create or wildcard (*) permissions specifically on the 'namespaces' resource type
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Identify subjects bound to namespace-permission rolesList all role bindings (cluster role bindings) that reference the roles identified in step 1. Check which users, groups, or service accounts are granted these roles.Affected if Any user, group, or service account is bound to a role that grants create or wildcard namespace permissions
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Verify if bindings are truly global vs scopedExamine the scope of the role bindings. Check whether they are cluster-scoped (global) bindings rather than namespace-scoped bindings that limit access to specific namespaces.Affected if Cluster-scoped bindings exist that grant namespace create or * permissions across all namespaces
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Review effective permissions granted by wildcard namespace rolesIf a role grants * permissions on namespaces, examine whether this inadvertently includes access to core namespace resources in other API groups beyond what was intended.Affected if The role grants wildcard (*) permissions on namespaces that could extend beyond the intended API group scope
A user is affected if they have been granted or are bound to a global cluster role that provides create or wildcard (*) permissions specifically on the namespaces resource type, as this may grant unintended full access to core namespaces across all API groups.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAudit and remediate all global roles that grant namespace permissions to ensure they only provide intended access levels; implement role-scoped assignments rather than global roles where possible.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,168.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-32194 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-32194 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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