GrafanaApplication · Tdengine
CVE-2023-34111
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe `Release PR Merged` workflow in the github repo taosdata/grafanaplugin is subject to a command injection vulnerability which allows for arbitrary code execution within the github action context due to the insecure usage of `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` in a bash command within the GitHub workflow. Attackers can inject malicious commands which will be executed by the workflow. This happens because `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` is directly passed to bash command on like 25 of the workflow. This may allow an attacker to gain access to secrets which the github action has access to or to otherwise make use of the compute resources.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisThe application accepts input without confirming it is well-formed or within expected bounds, so malformed data can push the program into states its author never anticipated. Attackers probe these gaps to trigger crashes, bypass logic, or feed tainted values into more dangerous operations downstream. Remediating it well means validating and normalising every input at the boundary against a strict allow-list — not merely filtering known-bad values.
General guidance for the improper input validation class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
GrafanaApplication
<= 2023-05-22CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped- 1. Locate the vulnerable workflow file in the repository at `.github/workflows/` (likely named something like `release-pr-merged.yml` or similar)
- 2. Find the line where `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` is directly used in a bash command (around line 25)
- 3. Sanitize the pull request title before using it in bash by escaping special characters. One approach is to use the `setOutput` method to pass sanitized data, or use a dedicated action like `actions/github-script` to safely handle the input
- 4. Alternatively, use the `toJSON` function to convert the entire event to a safe JSON string: `${{ toJSON(github.event.pull_request.title) }}` which will properly escape any special characters
- 5. Validate that the workflow no longer directly interpolates user-controlled input into bash commands
- 6. Commit and push the fixed workflow file
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-34111 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-34111 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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