CVE-2023-34205
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn Moov signedxml through 1.0.0, parsing the raw XML (as received) can result in different output than parsing the canonicalized XML. Thus, signature validation can be bypassed via a Signature Wrapping attack (aka XSW).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Moov signedxml library versions through 1.0.0 fails to properly canonicalize XML before signature validation. When raw XML (as received) is parsed versus canonicalized XML, different outputs result. This allows an attacker to perform a Signature Wrapping (XSW) attack by modifying the XML structure after signing while the signature still appears valid.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check signedxml version in useRun 'go list -m all | grep signedxml' or inspect your go.mod file for 'github.com/moov-io/signedxml'Affected if The version listed is 1.0.0 exactly
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Verify XML signature validation is performedSearch codebase for usage of SignedXML, Verify, or signature-related functions from the signedxml packageAffected if The application uses signedxml to validate XML signatures from external or untrusted sources
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Confirm XML content comes from external sourcesReview code paths where XML is received over network, uploaded, or parsed from user-controlled dataAffected if The validated XML originates from outside the application or from untrusted input
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Check for C14N canonicalization in signature workflowInspect the signedxml verification code path to see if Canonicalize or EnvelopedSignature transform is applied before signature validationAffected if No explicit canonicalization is performed prior to signature verification (raw XML is validated as-is)
You are affected if using signedxml version 1.0.0 to validate XML signatures from untrusted sources without applying explicit C14N canonicalization beforehand.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade signedxml to a version beyond 1.0.0 that implements proper XML canonicalization (C14N) before signature validation to ensure the signed content matches the validated content.
Latest patched version (check github.com/moov-io/signedxml releases for version after 1.0.0)
- Check your project's go.mod file to confirm you are using signedxml version 1.0.0 or a vulnerable earlier version
- Run 'go get github.com/moov-io/signedxml@latest' to fetch the latest version
- Run 'go mod tidy' to update dependencies
- Verify the upgrade by checking 'go list -m all' or reviewing go.mod to confirm the new signedxml version
- Rebuild and test your application to ensure the signature verification fix is working correctly
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,960.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-34205 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-34205 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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