CVE-2023-35818
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered on Espressif ESP32 3.0 (ESP32_rev300 ROM) devices. An EMFI attack on ECO3 provides the attacker with a capability to influence the PC value at the CPU context level, regardless of Secure Boot and Flash Encryption status. By using this capability, the attacker can exploit another behavior in the chip to gain unauthorized access to the ROM download mode. Access to ROM download mode may be further exploited to read the encrypted flash content in cleartext format or execute stub code.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceEMFI (Electromagnetic Fault Injection) attack on ESP32 ECO3 silicon revision allows attackers to manipulate the Program Counter (PC) register at the CPU context level, bypassing both Secure Boot and Flash Encryption. This PC manipulation enables unauthorized access to ROM download mode, which can then be exploited to read encrypted flash contents in plaintext or execute arbitrary stub code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1= 3.0= 3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the ESP32 silicon revisionUse esptool.py with the command 'python esptool.py -p /dev/ttyUSB0 chip_id' or read the chip's eFuse to determine the silicon revision (look for ECO3 or revision 3)Affected if The silicon revision is ECO3 (revision 3) on any of the affected chip variants
-
Identify the exact ESP32 chip modelRun 'python esptool.py -p /dev/ttyUSB0 chip_id' or check the markings on the physical chip packageAffected if The chip is one of: ESP32-D0WD V3, ESP32-D0WD-R2 V3, ESP32-U4WDH, ESP32-PICO-V3, ESP32-PICO-V3-02, ESP32-PICO-D4, ESP32-WROOM-32E, or ESP32-WROOM-32UE
-
Identify the firmware versionCheck the firmware version via esptool.py 'python esptool.py -p /dev/ttyUSB0 read_flash 0x1000 16' or consult your build documentation/partition tableAffected if The firmware version is exactly 3.0 or 3.1 on any of the affected chip models
-
Verify if Secure Boot or Flash Encryption is enabledCheck eFuse configuration using 'python esptool.py -p /dev/tTYUSB0 efuse_summary' to see if ABS_DONE_0 (Secure Boot) or FLASH_CRYPT_CNT (Flash Encryption) are setAffected if Secure Boot or Flash Encryption are enabled AND the chip is an affected ECO3 variant with firmware 3.0/3.1 - the device is exposed because the attack bypasses these protections
You are affected if your ESP32 uses ECO3 silicon revision with any of the listed firmware versions (3.0 or 3.1), regardless of whether Secure Boot or Flash Encryption is enabled, as these protections are bypassed by this hardware vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedNo software patch can remediate this hardware-level vulnerability; ECO3 silicon must be replaced with a fixed revision. Consider physical security controls to limit EMFI attack exposure until hardware is upgraded.
ESP32 Firmware 3.2 or later (or latest stable release)
- Identify the specific ESP32 variant in use from the affected products list (D0wd V3, D0wdr2 V3, U4wdh, Pico V3, Pico V3 02, Pico D4, Wroom 32e, or Wroom 32ue)
- Download the latest ESP32 firmware version (3.2 or later) from the official Espressif website at espressif.com
- Verify firmware integrity using Espressif's published checksums
- Update the ESP32 module firmware using ESP-IDF tools (esptool.py) or Espressif's flashing tools
- After update, verify the ROM version has been updated to a version beyond rev300
- If physical security is critical, consider whether the hardware revision (silicon step) also needs to be upgraded to a newer silicon revision if available
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,672.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-35818 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-35818 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data