CVE-2023-36160
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in Qubo Smart Plug10A version HSP02_01_01_14_SYSTEM-10 A, allows local attackers to gain sensitive information and other unspecified impact via UART console.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Qubo Smart Plug10A (version HSP02_01_01_14_SYSTEM-10 A) contains an exposed UART console interface that allows local attackers with physical access to the device to retrieve sensitive information. This vulnerability stems from debug UART pins left accessible on the PCB in production firmware, enabling direct communication with the device's console without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= hsp02_01_01_14_system-10_aCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device firmware versionCheck the firmware version of your Qubo Smart Plug 10A device. This may be visible on the device label, in the Quboworld app device information, or via firmware extraction from the device firmware image.Affected if The firmware version matches exactly: HSP02_01_01_14_SYSTEM-10_a (or is an earlier version if the vulnerable configuration was present)
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Physically inspect for exposed UART pinsOpen the device casing and examine the PCB for exposed UART pins (typically 4 pins in a row: TX, RX, GND, VCC). These are usually located near the edge of the PCB or near the microcontroller.Affected if Debug UART pins (TX, RX, GND, VCC) are physically accessible and exposed on the PCB without physical barriers or epoxy coating
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Test console access via UART interfaceConnect a USB-to-serial adapter to the exposed UART pins (TX to RX, RX to TX, GND to GND). Use terminal software (e.g., PuTTY, minicom) to connect at common baud rates (9600, 57600, 115200). Observe if a console prompt or shell appears without any authentication requirement.Affected if The UART console provides direct access to a shell or command prompt without requiring any username or password authentication
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Verify console has privileged accessOnce connected via UART, attempt to run privileged commands (such as whoami, id, cat /etc/passwd) to determine if the console provides root or administrator-level access.Affected if The UART console grants root or administrator-level access without authentication
You are affected if you own a Qubo Smart Plug 10A with firmware HSP02_01_01_14_SYSTEM-10_a and the device has physically accessible UART debug pins that grant unauthenticated console or shell access.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSecure or disable the UART debug interface in production firmware by removing console output, implementing authentication, or physically disabling the UART pins. Consider moving to a secure boot process that does not expose debugging interfaces.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-36160 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-36160 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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