CVE-2023-37281
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedContiki-NG is an operating system for internet-of-things devices. In versions 4.9 and prior, when processing the various IPv6 header fields during IPHC header decompression, Contiki-NG confirms the received packet buffer contains enough data as needed for that field. But no similar check is done before decompressing the IPv6 address. Therefore, up to 16 bytes can be read out of bounds on the line with the statement `memcpy(&ipaddr->u8[16 - postcount], iphc_ptr, postcount);`. The value of `postcount` depends on the address compression used in the received packet and can be controlled by the attacker. As a result, an attacker can inject a packet that causes an out-of-bound read. As of time of publication, a patched version is not available. As a workaround, one can apply the changes in Contiki-NG pull request #2509 to patch the system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisThe code reads past the end (or before the start) of a buffer, returning memory that was never meant to be exposed. Attackers use it to leak secrets like keys or to defeat memory-protection defences. Remediation is validating indices and lengths before every read.
General guidance for the out-of-bounds read class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 4.9CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped- Obtain the patch from GitHub PR #2509: https://github.com/contiki-ng/contiki-ng/pull/2509
- Review the diff/changes in the PR to understand the security fix being applied
- Locate the file containing the IPv6 IPHC decompression code (the vulnerable code performs memcpy for IPv6 address decompression)
- Apply the vendor-provided changes to add bounds checking before the memcpy operation that reads IPv6 address data
- Ensure the fix validates that sufficient data exists in the packet buffer before reading `postcount` bytes for IPv6 address decompression
- After applying the patch, rebuild the Contiki-NG firmware for your affected devices
- Re-flash the updated firmware to all affected IoT devices running Contiki-NG
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-37281 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-37281 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data