CVE-2023-38295
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCertain software builds for the TCL 30Z and TCL 10 Android devices contain a vulnerable, pre-installed app that relies on a missing permission that provides no protection at runtime. The missing permission is required as an access permission by components in various pre-installed apps. On the TCL 30Z device, the vulnerable app has a package name of com.tcl.screenrecorder (versionCode='1221092802', versionName='v5.2120.02.12008.1.T' ; versionCode='1221092805', versionName='v5.2120.02.12008.2.T'). On the TCL 10L device, the vulnerable app has a package name of com.tcl.sos (versionCode='2020102827', versionName='v3.2014.12.1012.B'). When a third-party app declares and requests the missing permission, it can interact with certain service components in the aforementioned apps (that execute with "system" privileges) to perform arbitrary files reads/writes in its context. An app exploiting this vulnerability only needs to declare and request the single missing permission and no user interaction is required beyond installing and running a third-party app. The software build fingerprints for each confirmed vulnerable device are as follows: TCL 10L (TCL/T770B/T1_LITE:11/RKQ1.210107.001/8BIC:user/release-keys) and TCL 30Z (TCL/4188R/Jetta_ATT:12/SP1A.210812.016/LV8E:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU5P:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU61:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU66:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU68:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU6P:user/release-keys, and TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU6X:user/release-keys). This malicious app declares the missing permission named com.tct.smart.switchphone.permission.SWITCH_DATA as a normal permission, requests the missing permission, and uses it to interact with the com.tct.smart.switchdata.DataService service component that is declared in vulnerable apps that execute with "system" privileges to perform arbitrary file reads/writes.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePre-installed apps on TCL 30Z and TCL 10L devices (com.tcl.screenrecorder and com.tcl.sos) lack proper permission enforcement for com.tct.smart.switchphone.permission.SWITCH_DATA. Third-party apps can declare this normal permission and interact with the privileged com.tct.smart.switchdata.DataService component running with system privileges to perform arbitrary file read/write operations. No user interaction is required beyond installing the malicious app.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelCheck if the device is a TCL 30Z or TCL 10L by going to Settings > About Phone > Model Number, or run 'getprop ro.product.model' via ADBAffected if Device model is TCL 30Z or TCL 10L (or any TCL device with the same pre-installed apps)
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Check for vulnerable pre-installed appsList installed packages using 'pm list packages' or check for com.tcl.screenrecorder and com.tcl.sos in Settings > AppsAffected if Either com.tcl.screenrecorder or com.tcl.sos app is present on the device
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Verify DataService component existsCheck if com.tct.smart.switchdata.DataService component is exposed by running 'dumpsys package com.tcl.sos' or 'dumpsys package com.tcl.screenrecorder' via ADB, looking for exported servicesAffected if The DataService component is exported and accessible to other apps
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Test permission enforcementAttempt to declare com.tct.smart.switchphone.permission.SWITCH_DATA in a test app manifest and check if the system grants it without signature protectionAffected if The SWITCH_DATA permission can be obtained by third-party apps without signature-level protection
A user is affected if they are running a TCL 30Z or TCL 10L device with the vulnerable com.tcl.screenrecorder or com.tcl.sos apps installed, and those apps expose the DataService component that accepts the SWITCH_DATA permission from any third-party app.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThis vulnerability requires an OEM firmware update from TCL to patch the vulnerable pre-installed apps. Users should avoid installing apps from untrusted sources and monitor for official security updates from TCL or their mobile carrier.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-38295 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-38295 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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