dbcve.org
Information ExposureWeakness · CWE-200

CVE-2023-38296

HIGH · 8.0 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-04-22
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
83/100
Remediation priority · High
No privileges

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Various software builds for the following TCL 30Z and TCL A3X devices leak the ICCID to a system property that can be accessed by any local app on the device without any permissions or special privileges. Google restricted third-party apps from directly obtaining non-resettable device identifiers in Android 10 and higher, but in these instances they are leaked by a high-privilege process and can be obtained indirectly. The software build fingerprints for each confirmed vulnerable device are as follows: TCL 30Z (TCL/4188R/Jetta_ATT:12/SP1A.210812.016/LV8E:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU5P:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU61:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU66:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU68:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU6P:user/release-keys, and TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU6X:user/release-keys) and TCL A3X (TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vAAZ:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vAB3:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vAB7:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABA:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABM:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABP:user/release-keys, and TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABS:user/release-keys). This malicious app reads from the "persist.sys.tctPowerIccid" system property to indirectly obtain the ICCID.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The TCL 30Z and TCL A3X devices leak the ICCID (SIM card identifier) to an unprotected system property ('persist.sys.tctPowerIccid'). A high-privilege system process writes the ICCID to this property, which any local application can read without requiring any Android permissions, effectively bypassing Android 10+ restrictions on accessing non-resettable device identifiers.

MitigationUsers should await an official firmware update from TCL that removes or secures the system property. As a defensive measure, organizations may consider network-level controls that do not rely solely on ICCID for device identification.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Adjacent
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify device model
    Run 'getprop ro.product.model' in ADB shell or check the device Settings > About Phone to confirm the exact model
    Affected if Device model is TCL 30Z or TCL A3X
  2. Check for vulnerable system property
    Execute 'getprop persist.sys.tctPowerIccid' in ADB shell or via app code using SystemProperties.get()
    Affected if The property 'persist.sys.tctPowerIccid' exists and returns a non-empty value resembling an ICCID (typically 19-20 digits)
  3. Verify property is unprotected
    Read the property from a non-privileged app context (without READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE permission) using the getprop command or SystemProperties.get() API
    Affected if The ICCID value is readable by any application without requiring special Android permissions, bypassing Android 10+ restrictions on non-resettable identifiers

Device is affected if it is a TCL 30Z or TCL A3X and the 'persist.sys.tctPowerIccid' property contains an ICCID value that can be read by any local application without permissions.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Users should await an official firmware update from TCL that removes or secures the system property. As a defensive measure, organizations may consider network-level controls that do not rely solely on ICCID for device identification.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,960
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,136.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-38296 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-38296 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data