CVE-2023-38298
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedVarious software builds for the following TCL devices (30Z, A3X, 20XE, 10L) leak the device IMEI to a system property that can be accessed by any local app on the device without any permissions or special privileges. Google restricted third-party apps from directly obtaining non-resettable device identifiers in Android 10 and higher, but in these instances they are leaked by a high-privilege process and can be obtained indirectly. The software build fingerprints for each confirmed vulnerable device are as follows: TCL 30Z (TCL/4188R/Jetta_ATT:12/SP1A.210812.016/LV8E:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU5P:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU61:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU66:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU68:user/release-keys, TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU6P:user/release-keys, and TCL/T602DL/Jetta_TF:12/SP1A.210812.016/vU6X:user/release-keys); TCL A3X (TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vAAZ:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vAB3:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vAB7:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABA:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABM:user/release-keys, TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABP:user/release-keys, and TCL/A600DL/Delhi_TF:11/RKQ1.201202.002/vABS:user/release-keys); TCL 20XE (TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB7I-0:user/release-keys and TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB83-0:user/release-keys); and TCL 10L (TCL/T770B/T1_LITE:10/QKQ1.200329.002/3CJ0:user/release-keys and TCL/T770B/T1_LITE:11/RKQ1.210107.001/8BIC:user/release-keys). This malicious app reads from the "gsm.device.imei0" system property to indirectly obtain the device IMEI.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceTCL devices (30Z, A3X, 20XE, 10L) leak the device IMEI to the 'gsm.device.imei0' system property, which any local app can read without any Android permissions. This bypasses Android 10+ restrictions that block direct access to non-resettable device identifiers, as a high-privilege system process inadvertently exposes the IMEI through an unprotected system property.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelCheck the device settings or use 'getprop ro.product.model' to see if the device is a TCL 30Z, A3X, 20XE, or 10LAffected if The device model is one of: TCL 30Z, TCL A3X, TCL 20XE, or TCL 10L
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Confirm Android versionCheck Settings > About Phone > Android version or use 'getprop ro.build.version.release'Affected if The device runs Android 10 or higher (the vulnerability specifically bypasses Android 10+ restrictions)
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Check for the exposed system propertyUse a terminal app or ADB shell to run 'getprop gsm.device.imei0'Affected if The command returns a 15-digit IMEI number, indicating the property exists and contains device identifier data
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Verify property accessibility without permissionsAttempt to read the property from a standard non-system app using the system properties API; if the IMEI is readable without the READ_PHONE_STATE permission, the device is vulnerableAffected if Any installed application can read 'gsm.device.imei0' without requiring any Android permissions
If the device is a TCL 30Z, A3X, 20XE, or 10L running Android 10+ and the 'gsm.device.imei0' system property returns a 15-digit IMEI that is accessible without permissions, the environment is affected by this CVE.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUsers cannot apply a traditional patch; remediation requires TCL to release firmware updates that restrict access to the 'gsm.device.imei0' system property. Organizations should inventory affected devices, consider device replacement or network-level controls, and monitor for OEM updates.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-38298 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-38298 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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