CVE-2023-41840
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA untrusted search path vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientWindows 7.0.9 allows an attacker to perform a DLL Hijack attack via a malicious OpenSSL engine library in the search path.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceFortiClientWindows 7.0.9 contains an untrusted search path vulnerability allowing DLL hijacking. An attacker can place a malicious OpenSSL engine library in the search path, causing the application to load the attacker-controlled DLL instead of the legitimate one, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0.9= 7.2.0= 7.2.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed FortiClient versionOpen Windows Settings > Apps > Apps & features, locate FortiClient, and note the version number. Alternatively, open FortiClient and go to Help > About, or run 'fcwin.exe -v' from the FortiClient installation directory.Affected if The version displayed is 7.0.9, 7.2.0, or 7.2.1 exactly.
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Locate FortiClient installation directoryThe default installation path is C:\Program Files\Fortinet\FortiClient\. Check for the presence of this folder and note its full path.Affected if FortiClient is installed and the directory exists.
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Check directory permissions for write accessRight-click the FortiClient installation folder, select Properties > Security, and review Write permissions for Users or non-admin groups. Use icacls command: icacls 'C:\Program Files\Fortinet\FortiClient\'Affected if Non-privileged users have Write or Create files permissions to the FortiClient directory.
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Inspect for suspicious OpenSSL engine DLLsSearch the FortiClient installation directory and system PATH directories for .dll files matching OpenSSL engine naming patterns (e.g., *engine*.dll, *.dll in subfolders named 'engines' or 'ssl'). Look for unknown or recently created DLLs.Affected if Unexpected DLL files are found in the FortiClient directory or search path that were not part of a legitimate installation.
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Review DLL search order behaviorFortiClient may load OpenSSL engine DLLs from its working directory or paths in the system PATH. Check if the application directory or any directory in PATH is writable by low-privilege users.Affected if Writable directories exist in the locations FortiClient searches for DLLs.
You are affected if FortiClient version 7.0.9, 7.2.0, or 7.2.1 is installed AND non-privileged users can write to directories in the DLL search path, allowing placement of malicious OpenSSL engine libraries.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor patches from Fortinet for FortiClientWindows. As a temporary workaround, ensure the application directory and search path are not writable by unprivileged users and avoid placing untrusted DLLs in locations searched by the application.
FortiClient 7.0.10 or 7.2.2 (or latest stable version)
- Upgrade FortiClient Windows to version 7.0.10 or later, or 7.2.2 or later
- Download the updated version from the official Fortinet support portal at https://support.fortinet.com/
- Verify the upgrade by checking Help > About FortiClient to confirm the installed version
- Ensure the upgrade is tested in a non-production environment before deploying widely
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-41840 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-41840 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data