CVE-2023-49565
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe cbis_manager Podman container is vulnerable to remote command execution via the /api/plugins endpoint. Improper sanitization of the HTTP Headers X-FILENAME, X-PAGE, and X-FIELD allows for command injection. These headers are directly utilized within the subprocess.Popen Python function without adequate validation, enabling a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying system by crafting malicious header values within an HTTP request to the affected endpoint. The web service executes with root privileges within the container environment, the demonstrated remote code execution permits an attacker to acquire elevated privileges for the command execution. Restricting access to the management network with an external firewall can partially mitigate this risk.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe cbis_manager Podman container contains a command injection vulnerability in the /api/plugins endpoint. The X-FILENAME, X-PAGE, and X-FIELD HTTP headers are passed directly to Python's subprocess.Popen function without sanitization, allowing remote attackers to inject arbitrary shell commands. Since the web service runs as root within the container, successful exploitation grants attackers elevated privileges on the underlying system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if cbis_manager container is runningRun 'podman ps -a --filter name=cbis_manager' or 'docker ps -a --filter name=cbis_manager' to list containers with cbis_manager in the nameAffected if A container with 'cbis_manager' in its name is present and running (status shows 'Up')
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Check the exposed network ports for the containerRun 'podman inspect <container_id> --format "{{.NetworkSettings.Ports}}"' or check the container's port mappings via 'podman port <container_id>'Affected if Port mappings exist that expose the container's web service to the host or network (particularly the port serving the /api/plugins endpoint)
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Verify if the container runs as rootRun 'podman inspect <container_id> --format "{{.Config.User}}"' to check the user the container executes asAffected if The output is empty, shows 'root', or shows no explicit non-root user configuration (indicating default root execution)
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Confirm the /api/plugins endpoint existsAttempt a harmless HTTP request to the container's web service at the /api/plugins path (e.g., curl -k http://<container_ip>:<port>/api/plugins)Affected if The endpoint responds (even with an error response) indicating it exists and processes requests with the vulnerable headers
A user is affected if they are running a cbis_manager container with the /api/plugins endpoint exposed and the container executes as root, allowing the X-FILENAME, X-PAGE, or X-FIELD headers to trigger arbitrary command execution.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThe primary remediation is implementing proper input validation and sanitization on the affected HTTP headers before they're used in subprocess calls. The container should also be reconfigured to run with least privilege rather than root. Network access restrictions via firewall provide partial mitigation but do not address the root cause.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-49565 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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