X2000r FirmwareOperating system · Totolink

CVE-2023-51136

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2023-12-30
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
TOTOLINK X2000R Gh v1.0.0-B20230221.0948.web was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function formRebootSchedule.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

A stack overflow vulnerability exists in the TOTOLINK X2000R Gh wireless router firmware (v1.0.0-B20230221.0948.web) within the formRebootSchedule web interface function. The stack overflow is exploitable remotely without authentication given the CVSS 9.8 score, and could potentially allow arbitrary code execution or device compromise.

MitigationApply vendor-supplied firmware updates when available; until then, restrict network access to the router's web management interface to trusted sources only.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
X2000r FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 1.0.0-b20230221.0948.web

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify router firmware version
    Log into the TOTOLINK X2000R web management interface and navigate to System Status or Firmware Upgrade page to view the current firmware version. Alternatively, check the firmware file name if you have direct access to the firmware image.
    Affected if The firmware version is exactly 1.0.0-B20230221.0948.web (only this specific version is listed as affected)
  2. Confirm the specific router model
    Verify that the device is specifically the TOTOLINK X2000R Gh model by checking the device label or the web interface status page.
    Affected if The device is a TOTOLINK X2000R Gh (the vulnerability is specific to this model)
  3. Check web management interface accessibility
    Determine if the router web interface (typically on ports 80 or 443) is exposed to the network by checking your router network configuration settings under Administration, Access Control, or similar.
    Affected if The web management interface is accessible from untrusted network segments (the vulnerability is exploitable remotely without authentication)
  4. Verify formRebootSchedule function exists
    Attempt to access the formRebootSchedule endpoint via HTTP POST request to the router (commonly at /cgi-bin/capi?formRebootSchedule or similar path under the router's web interface). The exact path can be discovered by analyzing the firmware or intercepting legitimate web requests.
    Affected if The formRebootSchedule function is present and responds to requests (this is the vulnerable component)

You are affected if you have a TOTOLINK X2000R Gh router running firmware version 1.0.0-B20230221.0948.web with the web interface accessible to the network and the formRebootSchedule function exposed.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply vendor-supplied firmware updates when available; until then, restrict network access to the router's web management interface to trusted sources only.

Fix this in X2000r Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
12.0 hours of engineering $2,120
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-51136 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-51136 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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