CVE-2023-52710
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHuawei Matebook D16(Model: CREM-WXX9, BIOS: v2.26), As the communication buffer size hasn’t been properly validated to be of the expected size, it can partially overlap with the beginning SMRAM.This can be leveraged by a malicious OS attacker to corrupt data structures stored at the beginning of SMRAM and can potentially lead to code execution in SMM.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vulnerability exists in the System Management Mode (SMM) communication buffer validation of Huawei Matebook D16 BIOS v2.26. The buffer size is not properly validated against the expected size, allowing the communication buffer to partially overlap with the beginning of SMRAM. A malicious OS-level attacker can exploit this to corrupt SMRAM data structures and potentially achieve code execution in SMM, which operates at the highest privilege level on the system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= ota-curiem-bios-2.29CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the system modelCheck if the system is a Huawei Matebook D16 or a device using Huawei Curiem Wfg9b firmware. Use system information tools (such as 'dmidecode' on Linux, 'systeminfo' on Windows, or check the BIOS setup screen) to retrieve the system model and manufacturer.Affected if The system is a Huawei Matebook D16 or a device with Huawei Curiem Wfg9b firmware.
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Retrieve the installed BIOS firmware versionAccess the BIOS/UEFI setup screen during boot (typically by pressing Del, F2, or F12) and navigate to the BIOS version information. Alternatively, use OS-level tools: on Linux, run 'dmidecode -s bios-version'; on Windows, run 'wmic bios get smbiosbiosversion'; or check the 'BIOS Information' section in the System Information tool (msinfo32).Affected if The installed BIOS version matches or falls within the affected version range (ota-curiem-bios-2.29 or version 2.26). Compare your retrieved version against the affected versions specified.
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Verify SMM is enabledCheck if System Management Mode is enabled in the BIOS/UEFI settings. Access the BIOS setup during boot and look for SMM-related settings (often under 'Advanced', 'Security', or 'CPU Configuration' sections). On Linux, you can also check 'cat /proc/cpuinfo' for SMME (SMM Enable) flag or use 'dmidecode' to query BIOS settings.Affected if SMM is enabled in the BIOS configuration - this is required for the vulnerability to be exploitable.
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Inspect SMRAM configurationOn Linux systems, verify SMRAM configuration by examining /sys/firmware/efi/smm_sw Dispatch_lock and checking if SMRAM regions are properly locked. Use 'efi-checker' or similar tools to parse UEFI variables. Also check dmesg for any SMRAM-related messages indicating whether SMRAM is locked or accessible.Affected if SMRAM is not properly locked or is accessible from the OS level, allowing potential buffer overlap with SMRAM regions.
The system is affected if it is a Huawei Matebook D16 or device with Huawei Curiem Wfg9b firmware, has BIOS version 2.26 or 2.29 (ota-curiem-bios-2.29), and has SMM enabled with improperly protected SMRAM.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor-supplied BIOS firmware update from Huawei to patch the SMM communication buffer validation vulnerability. Until the update is available, minimize exposure by ensuring only trusted software runs at the OS level.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-52710 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-52710 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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