CVE-2023-6248
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Syrus4 IoT gateway utilizes an unsecured MQTT server to download and execute arbitrary commands, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute code on any Syrus4 device connected to the cloud service. The MQTT server also leaks the location, video and diagnostic data from each connected device. An attacker who knows the IP address of the server is able to connect and perform the following operations: * Get location data of the vehicle the device is connected to * Send CAN bus messages via the ECU module ( https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/ecu-1 https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/ecu-1 ) * Immobilize the vehicle via the safe-immobilizer module ( https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#safe-immobilization https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#safe-immobilization ) * Get live video through the connected video camera * Send audio messages to the driver ( https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#apx-tts https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#apx-tts )
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Syrus4 IoT gateway communicates with a cloud service via an unsecured MQTT server that lacks authentication, allowing any remote attacker who discovers the server IP to connect without credentials. This enables full device compromise through arbitrary command execution, along with exposure of sensitive vehicle data including GPS location, video streams, and diagnostics.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= apex-23.43.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed firmware versionAccess the device administrative interface or check system information to retrieve the current firmware version numberAffected if The firmware version is exactly apex-23.43.2
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Locate the MQTT service configurationInspect the device configuration files or network settings to find the MQTT broker connection parametersAffected if MQTT is configured and enabled on the device
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Verify MQTT authentication settingsExamine the MQTT configuration for username, password, or certificate-based authentication settingsAffected if The MQTT connection lacks authentication credentials or uses blank/empty authentication fields
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Confirm MQTT transport securityCheck if the MQTT connection uses an unencrypted protocol (typically port 1883) rather than MQTTS (port 8883)Affected if MQTT is configured to use an unencrypted connection without TLS
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Assess network exposure of the MQTT serviceDetermine if the MQTT port is accessible from external networks or the internet rather than being restricted to local/internal networksAffected if The MQTT service is exposed to untrusted network segments
A user is affected if the device runs firmware version apex-23.43.2 with an unauthenticated, unencrypted MQTT service accessible on the network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement TLS-encrypted MQTTS with certificate-based mutual authentication, enforce proper access controls on the broker, and restrict network exposure; also review and secure the ECU and immobilizer command pathways to prevent unauthorized vehicle control.
- Consultation12.0 h
- Implementation32.0 h
- Testing24.0 h
- Review / QA12.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-6248 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-6248 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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