CVE-2023-6408
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCWE-924: Improper Enforcement of Message Integrity During Transmission in a Communication Channel vulnerability exists that could cause a denial of service and loss of confidentiality, integrity of controllers when conducting a Man in the Middle attack.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis is a CWE-924 vulnerability where message integrity is not properly enforced during transmission, allowing an attacker positioned between communicating parties (Man in the Middle) to intercept and potentially modify communications between controllers and their management systems without detection.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 3.60< 3.60< 3.60< 3.60< 3.60< 3.60< 3.60< 3.60CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Modicon M340 model numberLocate the physical PLC unit or check the system inventory for the model number printed on the CPU module. Look for model identifiers: Bmxp341000, Bmxp341000h, Bmxp342000, Bmxp342010, Bmxp3420102, Bmxp3420102cl, Bmxp342020, or Bmxp342020h.Affected if The installed model matches any of the listed affected model numbers.
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the PLC through Schneider Electric programming software (such as Unity Pro or EcoStruxure) and navigate to the CPU properties or system information to retrieve the firmware version. Alternatively, check via the web interface or console if available.Affected if The firmware version is below 3.60.
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Verify the communication channel integrity configurationExamine the network communication settings between the PLC and management systems. Check whether any message authentication, digital signatures, or integrity verification mechanisms are configured for the protocol in use (such as Modbus/TCP or other industrial protocols).Affected if No message integrity verification (MACs, digital signatures, or equivalent) is configured on the communication channels.
The environment is affected if a Modicon M340 model from the affected list is running firmware version 3.60 or lower and the communication channels lack message integrity protection.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped3.60
Implement cryptographic message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures for all communication channels between controllers and management systems to ensure message integrity during transmission.
Firmware version 3.60
- Identify all affected Modicon M340 PLCs in the inventory and document their current firmware versions
- Download the firmware version 3.60 or later from Schneider Electric's official support portal (download.schneider-electric.com)
- Review Schneider Electric's firmware upgrade documentation for Modicon M340 controllers
- Establish a maintenance window and implement a backup strategy for the PLC project/program
- Connect to the PLC using Unity Pro or EcoStruxure Control Expert programming software
- Upload the current project from the PLC for backup purposes
- Transfer the new firmware (version 3.60) to the PLC using the programming software's firmware update function
- Verify the firmware update was successful by checking the PLC's firmware version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-6408 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-6408 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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