CVE-2023-7334
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedChangjetong T+ versions up to and including 16.x contain a .NET deserialization vulnerability in an AjaxPro endpoint that can lead to remote code execution. A remote attacker can send a crafted request to /tplus/ajaxpro/Ufida.T.CodeBehind._PriorityLevel,App_Code.ashx?method=GetStoreWarehouseByStore with a malicious JSON body that leverages deserialization of attacker-controlled .NET types to invoke arbitrary methods such as System.Diagnostics.Process.Start. This can result in execution of arbitrary commands in the context of the T+ application service account. Exploitation evidence was observed by the Shadowserver Foundation as early as 2023-08-19 (UTC).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceChangjetong T+ versions up to 16.x contain a critical .NET deserialization vulnerability in the AjaxPro endpoint /tplus/ajaxpro/Ufida.T.CodeBehind._PriorityLevel,App_Code.ashx. Remote attackers can send crafted JSON requests that deserialize attacker-controlled .NET types, enabling invocation of arbitrary methods such as System.Diagnostics.Process.Start for remote code execution as the T+ service account.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 16.000.000.0283CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Chanjetvip T+ is installedLocate the T+ installation directory and check for typical T+ executable files or check installed programs list on the system. Look for version information in the installation folder or application metadata.Affected if Chanjetvip T+ software is found on the system
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Check installed T+ version against affected rangeLocate the version information file or executable metadata. Compare the full version number to 16.000.000.0283 using semantic version comparison.Affected if Installed version is 16.000.000.0283 or lower
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Verify the vulnerable AjaxPro endpoint is exposedAttempt to access the path /tplus/ajaxpro/Ufida.T.CodeBehind._PriorityLevel,App_Code.ashx via HTTP/HTTPS from an internal test system or check the web server configuration for URL routing rules that expose this handler.Affected if The endpoint responds or is configured to be accessible (returns any HTTP response other than 404)
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Confirm AjaxPro handler registrationExamine the web.config or application configuration files in the T+ web root for AjaxPro handler registrations. Look for entries matching the App_Code.ashx pattern.Affected if AjaxPro handler is registered and enabled in the application configuration
A user is affected if Chanjetvip T+ version 16.000.000.0283 or lower is installed AND the /tplus/ajaxpro/ endpoint is exposed and enabled.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor-provided patches for T+ version 16.x immediately. Additionally, restrict network access to the /tplus/ajaxpro/ endpoints via firewall or WAF rules to mitigate exploitation while patch is being deployed.
Contact Chanjet support for the specific version beyond 16.x that contains the security fix
- Contact Chanjet official support to confirm the latest patched version and obtain the upgrade package
- Verify the current T+ installation version to confirm it is <= 16.000.000.0283
- Obtain the upgrade package from official Chanjet channels (do not use third-party sources)
- Schedule a maintenance window and backup the T+ database and configuration
- Apply the upgrade in a test environment first to validate compatibility
- Deploy the upgrade to production during the maintenance window
- Verify the AjaxPro endpoint /tplus/ajaxpro/Ufida.T.CodeBehind._PriorityLevel,App_Code.ashx is no longer accessible or is properly secured after upgrade
- Monitor for any anomalous activity and review application logs
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-7334 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-7334 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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