CVE-2024-10025
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the .sdd file allows an attacker to read default passwords stored in plain text within the code. By exploiting these plaintext credentials, an attacker can log into affected SICK products as an “Authorized Client” if the customer has not changed the default password.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in the .sdd file format used by SICK products stores default passwords in plaintext. An attacker who obtains this file (through any method of file access) can read the credentials and authenticate as an 'Authorized Client' on affected SICK devices where the default password has not been changed.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate .sdd files in your environmentSearch file systems for files with the .sdd extension, particularly in configuration directories, backup locations, or network shares where SICK device configuration files may be storedAffected if Any .sdd files exist that were created using default SICK software settings
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Inspect .sdd file contents for plaintext passwordsOpen or parse the .sdd file using a text editor or hex viewer to examine whether default credentials are stored in cleartext within the fileAffected if The .sdd file contains readable default password strings rather than hashed or encrypted values
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Check SICK device authentication configurationAccess the SICK device management interface and review the 'Authorized Client' account settings to determine if default passwords are still in useAffected if The device is configured with factory-default credentials associated with the .sdd file format
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Identify SICK software versions using .sdd filesCheck the SICK software/application version used to generate or open the .sdd files (typically found in software 'About' or help sections)Affected if The software version predates the vendor fix for this vulnerability
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Review access controls on .sdd filesAudit file permissions and network access controls on directories containing .sdd files to determine if unauthorized parties could obtain these filesAffected if The .sdd files are stored in locations accessible to non-administrative users or over unsecured network paths
You are affected if any .sdd files in your environment contain default plaintext passwords that could be extracted and used to authenticate to SICK devices as an Authorized Client.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately change all default passwords on affected SICK devices to strong, unique credentials and audit for any remaining default credentials in use.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-10025 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-10025 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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