CVE-2024-1139
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA credentials leak vulnerability was found in the cluster monitoring operator in OCP. This issue may allow a remote attacker who has basic login credentials to check the pod manifest to discover a repository pull secret.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe cluster monitoring operator in OpenShift Container Platform exposes repository pull credentials through pod manifests that are readable by users with basic login privileges. An authenticated attacker with minimal access can view pod manifests to extract stored repository pull secrets.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm OpenShift Container Platform is deployedCheck if the cluster is running OpenShift by running 'oc get clusterversion' or checking for the 'openshift' namespaceAffected if The cluster is running OpenShift Container Platform and has the cluster monitoring operator installed
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Identify the cluster monitoring operator namespaceRun 'oc get namespaces | grep -E "monitoring|openshift-monitoring"' to find the monitoring namespace, typically 'openshift-monitoring'Affected if The cluster monitoring operator is deployed in a namespace accessible to basic users
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Check if basic users can read pod manifests in the monitoring namespaceRun 'oc auth can-i get pods --as=<regular-user>' in the openshift-monitoring namespace, or attempt to list pods as a non-privileged user with 'oc get pods -n openshift-monitoring --as=<test-user>'Affected if Users with basic login privileges (cluster-reader role or similar) can list and view pods in the monitoring namespace
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Inspect pod manifests for exposed pull secretsRun 'oc get pods -n openshift-monitoring -o yaml' and search for 'imagePullSecrets' or 'pull_secret' fields in the pod specifications, or check specific operator pods like 'prometheus-k8s-*'Affected if Pod manifests in the monitoring namespace contain 'imagePullSecrets' or references to repository pull credentials
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Verify secret access by basic usersRun 'oc get secrets -n openshift-monitoring --as=<test-user>' to check if non-admin users can read secret resources, or check if secrets are mounted as volumes in pod definitionsAffected if Repository pull secrets (e.g., registry credentials) are accessible or visible to users with basic cluster access
A user is affected if OpenShift Container Platform with cluster monitoring operator is deployed AND users with basic login privileges can view pod manifests or secrets containing repository pull credentials in the monitoring namespace.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict access to pod manifests in the cluster monitoring operator namespace or rotate the exposed pull secrets and reconfigure the operator to use a more secure secret management approach.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-1139 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-1139 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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