CVE-2024-1182
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUncontrolled Search Path Element vulnerability in Mitsubishi Electric GENESIS64 versions 10.97.3 and prior, Mitsubishi Electric ICONICS Suite versions 10.97.3 and prior, Mitsubishi Electric Hyper Historian versions 10.97.3 and prior, Mitsubishi Electric MC Works64 all versions, Mitsubishi Electric GENESIS32 versions 9.7 and prior, Mitsubishi Electric Iconics Digital Solutions GENESIS64 versions 10.97.3 and prior, Mitsubishi Electric Iconics Digital Solutions ICONICS Suite versions 10.97.3 and prior, Mitsubishi Electric Iconics Digital Solutions Hyper Historian versions 10.97.3 and prior, and Mitsubishi Electric Iconics Digital Solutions GENESIS32 versions 9.7 and prior allows a local attacker to execute a malicious code by storing a specially crafted DLL in a specific folder when GENESIS64, ICONICS Suite, Hyper Historian, GENESIS32, and MC Works64 are installed with the Pager agent in the alarm multi-agent notification feature.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a DLL hijacking vulnerability (Uncontrolled Search Path Element) affecting multiple Mitsubishi Electric industrial software products (GENESIS64, ICONICS Suite, Hyper Historian, GENESIS32, MC Works64) when installed with the Pager agent in the alarm multi-agent notification feature. A local attacker can place a malicious DLL in a specific folder that the application searches, achieving arbitrary code execution with the application's privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Mitsubishi Electric industrial softwareCheck Program Files for GENESIS64, ICONICS Suite, Hyper Historian, GENESIS32, or MC Works64 installations. Use Add/Remove Programs or PowerShell: Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayNameAffected if Any of these products are installed on the system
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Verify Pager agent configuration statusAccess the alarm notification configuration within the installed product and check if the Pager agent is enabled or configuredAffected if The Pager agent is enabled in the alarm multi-agent notification feature
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Identify the vulnerable DLL search pathLocate the folder where the Pager agent searches for DLLs. Check application documentation or configuration files for the DLL search path used by the alarm notification featureAffected if A DLL search path is defined and accessible to local users with write permissions
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Examine the folder for suspicious DLL filesList all DLL files in the identified folder. Look for unauthorized or unexpected DLLs that do not belong to the productAffected if Unexpected or malicious DLL files are present in the search path folder
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Review application logs for exploitation indicatorsCheck application and Windows event logs for DLL loading errors, failed load attempts, or suspicious activity related to the Pager agentAffected if Logs show DLL loading failures or unauthorized execution attempts
A user is affected if they have any of the listed products installed with the Pager agent enabled and the DLL search path is accessible to local attackers for DLL planting.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataOrganizations should identify and remove any pre-existing malicious DLLs in the affected folder path, implement secure DLL loading practices (explicit paths, hash verification), and consider removing or securing the Pager agent configuration if not required. Review application logs for signs of exploitation.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-1182 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-1182 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data