CVE-2024-12236
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security issue exists in Vertex Gemini API for customers using VPC-SC. By utilizing a custom crafted file URI for image input, data exfiltration is possible due to requests being routed outside the VPC-SC security perimeter, circumventing the intended security restrictions of VPC-SC. No further fix actions are needed. Google Cloud Platform implemented a fix to return an error message when a media file URL is specified in the fileUri parameter and VPC Service Controls is enabled. Other use cases are unaffected.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in Vertex Gemini API allows data exfiltration for VPC-SC users by using custom file URIs for image inputs, routing requests outside the VPC Service Controls security perimeter and bypassing intended restrictions. Google has implemented a fix that returns an error when a media file URL is specified in the fileUri parameter while VPC Service Controls is enabled.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Vertex Gemini API usageIdentify if your project or application integrates with Google Vertex Gemini API for AI model interactions. Review API call logs or code references to vertex.googleapis.com or generationai.googleapis.com endpoints.Affected if Your environment uses Vertex Gemini API for model inference.
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Verify VPC Service Controls is enabledCheck your Google Cloud project settings to confirm VPC Service Controls are enabled for Vertex AI/Vertex Gemini. This can be done via the Google Cloud Console under Security > VPC Service Controls, or using gcloud compute networks peerings list --flatten="peerings[]" if VPC-SC is configured.Affected if VPC Service Controls are enabled for the project using Vertex Gemini API.
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Test fileUri parameter rejection with VPC-SCAttempt to make a Vertex Gemini API request using the fileUri parameter to reference a media file (such as an image for multimodal input) while VPC Service Controls is enabled. This simulates the original attack vector.Affected if The API accepts the fileUri and processes the request without returning an error, indicating the vulnerability may still be present.
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Verify error response for media file URLsConfirm that when a media file URL is specified in the fileUri parameter with VPC-SC enabled, the API returns an error response. Check for error codes indicating the request was blocked due to VPC Service Controls policy violation.Affected if No error is returned and the request succeeds - the fix is not functioning properly.
You are affected if your environment uses Vertex Gemini API with VPC Service Controls enabled AND the API does NOT return an error when a fileUri parameter is specified, indicating the vulnerability fix is not functioning.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedNo further action required; Google has already implemented the fix. Organizations using VPC-SC with Vertex Gemini should verify that the error messages are properly returned when media file URLs are used.
- No further fix actions are required. Google Cloud Platform has already implemented a fix that returns an error message when a media file URL is specified in the fileUri parameter and VPC Service Controls is enabled.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-12236 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-12236 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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