CVE-2024-12371
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA device takeover vulnerability exists in the Rockwell Automation Power Monitor 1000. This vulnerability allows configuration of a new Policyholder user without any authentication via API. Policyholder user is the most privileged user that can perform edit operations, creating admin users and performing factory reset.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnauthenticated API vulnerability in Rockwell Automation Power Monitor 1000 allows remote attackers to create a Policyholder user (highest privilege level) without any authentication. The Policyholder can then create additional admin users and perform factory resets, enabling complete device takeover.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device is a Power Monitor 1000Access the device web interface or check the device identification API endpoint to retrieve the model name and firmware versionAffected if The device model is Rockwell Automation Power Monitor 1000 and the firmware version has not been patched to the vendor-recommended version
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Verify API endpoint accessibilityAttempt to reach the device API endpoints (typically ports 80/443 or custom API ports) from an external network location to determine if the API is network-exposedAffected if The API responds to unauthenticated requests from untrusted network segments
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Enumerate user accounts for unauthorized PolicyholderQuery the device user management API or access the user list through the administrative interface to list all users and their privilege levelsAffected if A user account with Policyholder (highest privilege) exists that was not created by an authorized administrator
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Check for unexpected admin-level usersReview the user list for any newly created administrative accounts beyond the originally configured administratorsAffected if Additional users with administrative or elevated privileges exist that were not intentionally created
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Inspect device logs for unauthorized creation eventsAccess device event logs or security logs and search for entries indicating user creation, policyholder assignment, or factory reset operations with timestamps or source IP addresses outside expected parametersAffected if Logs contain user creation events, Policyholder assignments, or factory reset operations that were not initiated by known administrators
A user is affected if they have a Rockweell Automation Power Monitor 1000 with network-accessible API that contains unauthorized Policyholder or administrative user accounts, or shows corresponding log entries for such creations.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor firmware patch when available; until then, restrict network access to the device API using firewalls or network segmentation, and monitor for unauthorized user creation in device logs.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-12371 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-12371 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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