CVE-2024-12617
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe WC Price History for Omnibus plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on several AJAX actions in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.3. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to view and modify history data.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe WC Price History for Omnibus WordPress plugin fails to enforce proper capability checks on multiple AJAX action handlers. This allows any authenticated user with Subscriber-level permissions (the lowest privilege level in WordPress) to execute these AJAX functions and access or manipulate price history data that should be restricted to higher-privileged roles like Administrators.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify the plugin is installedNavigate to WordPress Admin > Plugins and confirm 'WC Price History for Omnibus' is installed and active, or inspect the file wp-content/plugins/wc-price-history-for-omnibus/plugin.php to read the version headerAffected if The plugin is installed and active
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Identify the installed versionOpen the plugin's main file (typically wc-price-history-for-omnibus.php or plugin.php in the plugin directory) and locate the Version header in the plugin comment block, then compare against the version that includes the fixAffected if The installed version predates the patched version with proper capability checks
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Check for low-privilege user accountsIn WordPress Admin, go to Users and review the list. Note any users with the Subscriber role, or check if user registration is enabled under Settings > General > MembershipAffected if Any Subscriber-level accounts exist, or user registration is enabled allowing public registration
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Test AJAX access from low-privilege accountUsing a Subscriber-level account, attempt to access wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action parameters used by this plugin (such as wph_ajax requests). Send a authenticated request and observe if data is returned without permission errorsAffected if AJAX requests execute successfully and return price history data despite the user lacking administrator privileges
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Review user role capabilities for AJAX actionsInspect the plugin source code in wp-content/plugins/wc-price-history-for-omnibus/ for AJAX callback functions and verify if they include current_user_can() or capability checks before processing requestsAffected if AJAX handlers lack capability checks (no current_user_can() calls) and execute for any authenticated user
You are affected if the WC Price History for Omnibus plugin is installed with a vulnerable version AND any Subscriber-level user account exists or user registration is enabled, allowing low-privilege users to access restricted price history data via AJAX.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate the plugin to the latest version which implements proper capability checks on AJAX actions. Until then, consider disabling the plugin or restricting user registration.
2.1.4 or later
- Log in to WordPress admin dashboard
- Navigate to Plugins > Installed Plugins
- Find 'WC Price History for Omnibus' in the plugin list
- Click 'Update now' if an update is available, or manually download the latest version from wordpress.org/plugins/wc-price-history-for-omnibus and upload it
- After updating, verify the new version number reflects the patch (2.1.4 or higher)
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-12617 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-12617 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data