Ata 191 FirmwareOperating system · Cisco
CVE-2024-20421
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter firmware could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack and perform arbitrary actions on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient CSRF protections for the web-based management interface of an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by persuading a user to follow a crafted link. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform arbitrary actions on the affected device with the privileges of the targeted user.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a CSRF vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapters. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit insufficient CSRF protections by tricking an authenticated user into clicking a malicious link, allowing arbitrary actions to be performed on the device with the targeted user's privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Ata 191 FirmwareOperating system
< 12.0.2< 11.2.5
Ata 192 FirmwareOperating system
< 11.2.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device model is Cisco ATA 191 or 192Check the device label or access the web management interface to view the product model. In the web UI, this is typically visible on the System Info or Status page.Affected if The device is a Cisco ATA 191 or ATA 192 series analog telephone adapter.
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Determine firmware versionIn the web-based management interface, navigate to System Info or Administration > Firmware Upgrade to view the installed firmware version. Alternatively, access the CLI and run 'show version' or 'show system-info'.Affected if The installed firmware version is lower than 12.0.2 or 11.2.5 (specifically, any version < 12.0.2 for ATA 191, or any version < 11.2.5 for ATA 191/ATA 192).
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Verify web management interface is enabled and accessibleAttempt to access the device's web management interface by entering the device IP address in a web browser. Check if HTTP or HTTPS management is enabled in the device configuration.Affected if The web-based management interface is enabled and reachable on the network, creating the attack surface for CSRF exploitation.
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Confirm administrative access is possibleVerify that an authenticated session can be established with the web management interface by logging in with administrator credentials.Affected if Administrative users can authenticate to the web interface, as CSRF attacks require a logged-in session to be hijacked.
The environment is affected if the device is a Cisco ATA 191 or 192 running firmware version lower than 12.0.2 (for ATA 191) or lower than 11.2.5 (for ATA 191/192), with the web-based management interface enabled and accessible to users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data11.2.512.0.2
Apply the Cisco firmware update when available. In the interim, advise users to avoid clicking untrusted links while logged into the device management interface, and consider network segmentation to reduce exposure.
Fix this in Ata 191 Firmware
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,304.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-20421 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-20421 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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