CVE-2024-21960
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIncorrect default permissions in the AMD Optimizing CPU Libraries (AOCL) installation directory could allow an attacker to achieve privilege escalation potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAMD Optimizing CPU Libraries (AOCL) are shipped with overly permissive default permissions on the installation directory, allowing unprivileged local users to modify executable files or libraries. This enables privilege escalation to root or execution with elevated privileges, leading to arbitrary code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate AOCL installationSearch for AMD Optimizing CPU Libraries by checking common installation paths such as /opt/AMD, /opt/aocl, or using 'find /opt -name "*aocl*" -o -name "*amd*" 2>/dev/null' to locate the directory.Affected if AOCL is installed in any directory on the system
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Check installation directory permissionsRun 'ls -ld <aocl_directory>' on the AOCL installation directory. Look for 'drwxrwxrwx' (world-writable) or 'drwxrwxrwx' in the permission string.Affected if The directory permissions show 'w' in the 'other' section (e.g., drwxrwxrwx) indicating world-writable access
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Check executable and library file permissionsRun 'find <aocl_directory> -type f \( -name "*.so" -o -name "*" \) -perm -002' to find any world-writable files in the AOCL directory and subdirectories.Affected if Any executable (.so, binaries) or library files are returned by this search, indicating they are world-writable
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Verify ownershipRun 'ls -lR <aocl_directory>' and check if files and directories are owned by privileged users (root or specific admin accounts) rather than unprivileged users.Affected if Files are owned by unprivileged users or the directory allows modification by any user due to permissive permissions
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Check for world-writable subdirectoriesRun 'find <aocl_directory> -type d -perm -002' to identify any world-writable directories within the AOCL installation tree.Affected if Any subdirectory within AOCL is world-writable, allowing attackers to replace executables or libraries
A user is affected if the AOCL installation directory or any of its contents are world-writable (permissions include 'w' for 'others'), allowing unprivileged users to modify executables or libraries for privilege escalation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply restrictive file permissions (typically 755 for directories, 644 for files, with appropriate ownership) to the AOCL installation directory and its contents, removing world-writable permissions and ensuring only privileged users can modify executables.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-21960 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-21960 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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