CVE-2024-24972
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBuffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (CWE-120) in the Controller 6000 and Controller 7000 diagnostic web interface allows an authorised and authenticated operator to reboot the Controller, causing a Denial of Service. Gallagher recommend the diagnostic web page is not enabled (default is off) unless advised by Gallagher Technical support. This interface is intended only for diagnostic purposes. This issue affects: Controller 6000 and Controller 7000 9.10 prior to vCR9.10.240816a (distributed in 9.10.1530 (MR2)), 9.00 prior to vCR9.00.240816a (distributed in 9.00.2168 (MR4)), 8.90 prior to vCR8.90.240816a (distributed in 8.90.2155 (MR5)), 8.80 prior to vCR8.80.240816b (distributed in 8.80.1938 (MR6)), all versions of 8.70 and prior.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA buffer overflow vulnerability (CWE-120) exists in the diagnostic web interface of Gallagher Controller 6000 and 7000. An authenticated operator can send input without proper size validation, causing a buffer overflow that triggers an uncontrolled reboot of the controller, resulting in denial of service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Gallagher Controller modelLocate the physical hardware label or check the system inventory/asset management database for the controller model number. Confirm it is either a Controller 6000 or Controller 7000.Affected if The model is a Gallagher Controller 6000 or 7000.
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the controller admin interface or use the command-line interface to retrieve the firmware version. Look for a version number in the format such as vCR9.10.x, vCR9.00.x, vCR8.90.x, or vCR8.80.x.Affected if The version is lower than the patched releases (vCR9.10.240816a, vCR9.00.240816a, vCR8.90.240816a, or vCR8.80.240816b).
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Verify the diagnostic web interface statusAccess the controller configuration settings and locate the diagnostic web interface option. Confirm whether it is enabled or disabled in the security or network settings.Affected if The diagnostic web interface is enabled (this is the required attack surface for the vulnerability).
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Review system logs for unexpected rebootsCheck the controller event logs or system logs for entries indicating unexpected reboots, system crashes, or buffer overflow errors around the time of any incidents.Affected if There are unexplained controller reboots or crash logs that correlate with authenticated operator access to the diagnostic interface.
The environment is affected if it is a Gallagher Controller 6000 or 7000 with the diagnostic web interface enabled and a firmware version lower than the patched releases.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedKeep the diagnostic web interface disabled (default setting). If enabled per Gallagher Technical Support guidance, ensure only trusted authenticated operators have access and apply the vendor patches (vCR9.10.240816a, vCR9.00.240816a, vCR8.90.240816a, or vCR8.80.240816b depending on version).
Upgrade to the appropriate fixed version: vCR9.10.240816a (9.10.1530 MR2), vCR9.00.240816a (9.00.2168 MR4), vCR8.90.240816a (8.90.2155 MR5), or vCR8.80.240816b (8.80.1938 MR6) based on your current release line
- 1. Identify the current firmware version of the Controller 6000 or Controller 7000
- 2. Based on your current version line, upgrade to the corresponding fixed release: For 9.10.x upgrade to vCR9.10.240816a (available in 9.10.1530 MR2); For 9.00.x upgrade to vCR9.00.240816a (available in 9.00.2168 MR4); For 8.90.x upgrade to vCR8.90.240816a (available in 8.90.2155 MR5); For 8.80.x upgrade to vCR8.80.240816b (available in 8.80.1938 MR6); For 8.70 and prior, upgrade to a supported ve
- 3. As a defensive measure, verify that the diagnostic web interface remains disabled (default state) unless explicitly required and approved by Gallagher Technical Support
- 4. After upgrade, confirm the controller is functioning normally and the vulnerability is resolved
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-24972 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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