CVE-2024-25731
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Elink Smart eSmartCam (com.cn.dq.ipc) application 2.1.5 for Android contains hardcoded AES encryption keys that can be extracted from a binary file. Thus, encryption can be defeated by an attacker who can observe packet data (e.g., over Wi-Fi).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Elink Smart eSmartCam Android application version 2.1.5 contains hardcoded AES encryption keys embedded in its binary. An attacker can extract these keys by reverse-engineering the APK, then use them to decrypt network traffic captured over Wi-Fi, effectively defeating the application's encryption mechanism.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.1.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed eSmartCam versionOn the Android device, navigate to Settings > Apps > eSmartCam and view the version number. Alternatively, use ADB command: adb shell dumpsys package | grep -i esmartcamAffected if The installed version is exactly 2.1.5
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Obtain the application APKExtract the APK from the device using ADB: adb shell pm path com.elinksmart.esmartcam, then pull: adb pull /data/app/.../base.apk. Or download the APK from the original source.Affected if You have access to the APK file for analysis
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Search APK for hardcoded AES keysDecompile the APK using jadx or apktool. Search decompiled Java/SMALI files and resources for hardcoded encryption keys: look for 16-byte, 24-byte, or 32-byte hex strings that may represent AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256 keys. Use grep for patterns like 'key', 'aes', or large hex strings.Affected if Hardcoded AES encryption keys are found embedded in the APK binary or resources
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Verify network traffic vulnerabilityConfigure a proxy (e.g., Burp Suite,mitmproxy) or use tcpdump to capture network traffic from the device while using the app. Attempt to decrypt any captured traffic using the extracted keys.Affected if Network traffic can be decrypted using extracted hardcoded keys, indicating the encryption is defeated
User is affected if eSmartCam version 2.1.5 is installed and the APK contains hardcoded AES keys that can be extracted to decrypt network communications.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace hardcoded AES keys with proper key management: use Android Keystore for key storage, implement secure key exchange protocols, or generate unique per-instance keys. Re-release the application and notify users to update.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-25731 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-25731 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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