CVE-2024-28955
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAffected devices create coredump files when crashed, storing them with world-readable permission. Any local user of the device can examine the coredump files, and research the memory contents. As for the details of affected product names, model numbers, and versions, refer to the information provided by the respective vendors listed under [References].
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAffected devices create coredump files with world-readable permissions (e.g., 0666) when processes crash. Any local user can read these memory dumps, potentially exposing sensitive data such as credentials, keys, session tokens, and other in-memory secrets.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify if coredump generation is enabledCheck the system resource limits using 'ulimit -c' or review /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern and /proc/sys/kernel/core_uses_pid. Also check systemd-coredump if installed using 'coredumpctl list' or 'systemctl status systemd-coredump@*'.Affected if Coredump generation is enabled and processes can produce crash dumps
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Inspect coredump file permission settingsCheck the coredump configuration in /etc/security/limits.conf or /etc/security/limits.d/ for any 'core' soft/hard limits. For systemd systems, examine /etc/systemd/coredump.conf (or /etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/*.conf) for the 'ProcessSizeMax' and 'Storage' settings. Also check the umask setting in shell profiles or system-wide login.defs.Affected if No restrictive umask (e.g., 0077) is set, or coredump permissions are explicitly set to 0666 or world-readable defaults
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Check coredump storage directory permissionsReview the directory where coredumps are saved (typically /var/crash, /var/tmp, or the directory specified in core_pattern). List the directory contents with 'ls -la <coredump_directory>' and check group/other permissions on both the directory and any existing coredump files.Affected if The coredump storage directory or existing coredump files grant read access to all users (e.g., drwxrwxrwx or -rw-rw-rw-- permissions)
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Examine active coredump file permissionsIf any coredump files exist on the system (search in /var/crash, /var/tmp, application working directories, or the root filesystem with 'find / -name "core*" -type f 2>/dev/null'), inspect their permissions using 'ls -la' on each file.Affected if Any coredump file shows world-readable permissions (0666 or similar)
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Review system-wide security policies for coredumpsCheck if the kernel parameter kernel.core_pattern is set to pipe coredumps to a secure handler. Verify if /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains '|' (pipe to program) which may indicate a custom handler, and review that handler's security configuration. Also check sysctl settings 'sysctl kernel.core_pattern' and 'sysctl -a | grep core'.Affected if Coredumps are being saved directly to the filesystem without restrictive permissions or secure handling
The environment is affected if coredumps are enabled and any coredump files or their storage directory grant world-readable (other) permissions, allowing any local user to read potentially sensitive memory contents.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataConfigure coredump generation to use restrictive file permissions (e.g., 0600) or disable coredumps if not required, and ensure coredump files are stored in protected directories with limited access.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-28955 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-28955 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data