CVE-2024-3182
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedInstall-type password disclosure vulnerability in Universal Installer including the Silent Installer in TIBCO Hawk versions 6.2.0, 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 allows user's Enterprise Message Service (EMS) password to be exposed outside of the hawkagent.cfg and hawkevent.cfg config files.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceTIBCO Hawk versions 6.2.0 through 6.2.3 contain a password disclosure vulnerability in the Universal Installer and Silent Installer where the Enterprise Message Service (EMS) password is exposed outside of the expected hawkagent.cfg and hawkagent.cfg configuration files, potentially to logs, temporary files, or other insecure locations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify TIBCO Hawk installed versionRun 'tibhawk -version' or check the installation directory for version information in the product manifest or README fileAffected if Version is 6.2.0, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, or 6.2.3
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Confirm EMS password was configured during installationReview installation documentation or check if Enterprise Message Service (EMS) was enabled and a password was set in the hawkagent.cfg configuration fileAffected if EMS was configured with a password and the Hawk version is within the affected range
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Examine installation logs for password exposureSearch installation log files in the installation directory and any logs generated during initial setup or upgrade for strings matching the EMS password or patterns like 'password', 'ems', 'EMS'Affected if Log files contain the EMS password in plain text or in unexpected locations
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Inspect temporary directories for credential exposureReview temporary directories used during installation (such as system temp folders, installation working directories) for any files that may contain the EMS passwordAffected if Temporary files or working files contain the EMS password in plain text
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Check for duplicate or secondary config file locationsSearch for any hawkagent.cfg copies, backup files, or configuration files outside the primary config directory that may contain the EMS passwordAffected if Additional configuration files or backups exist and contain the EMS password in plain text
A user is affected if TIBCO Hawk version 6.2.0 through 6.2.3 is installed, EMS was configured with a password during installation, and the password appears in logs, temp files, or configuration files other than the primary hawkagent.cfg
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRotate any EMS passwords that may have been exposed during installation and upgrade to a patched version of TIBCO Hawk. Review installation logs and temporary directories for credential exposure.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-3182 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-3182 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data