CVE-2024-32884
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedgitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-transport` does not check the username part of a URL for text that the external `ssh` program would interpret as an option. A specially crafted clone URL can smuggle options to SSH. The possibilities are syntactically limited, but if a malicious clone URL is used by an application whose current working directory contains a malicious file, arbitrary code execution occurs. This is related to the patched vulnerability GHSA-rrjw-j4m2-mf34, but appears less severe due to a greater attack complexity. This issue has been patched in versions 0.35.0, 0.42.0 and 0.62.0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencegix-transport in gitoxide fails to sanitize the username portion of clone URLs before passing them to the external SSH program. This allows attackers to inject SSH options (e.g., -o, -F) via specially crafted usernames. When an application uses such a malicious URL while its working directory contains a specially named file, arbitrary code execution becomes possible.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify gitoxide versionCheck the installed version of gitoxide or gix-transport by examining your Cargo.lock file, package manager records, or running `cargo tree -p gitoxide` or `cargo tree -p gix-transport` in the project directoryAffected if The installed version is lower than 0.35.0, 0.42.0, or 0.62.0 (the specific minimum depends on which release branch you are on)
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Determine if gix-transport is usedReview your project dependencies to confirm that gix-transport or gitoxide is listed as a dependency in Cargo.toml or Cargo.lockAffected if gix-transport or gitoxide is present in the dependency tree and the version is vulnerable
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Check for URL input from untrusted sourcesAudit the codebase to determine if clone URLs are accepted from user input, configuration files, or external/untrusted sources without validationAffected if The application accepts clone URLs from untrusted or user-supplied sources without sanitizing the username portion
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Inspect working directory for specially named filesExamine the application's working directory for files with unusual names that could be leveraged by an attacker in conjunction with malicious SSH optionsAffected if The working directory contains files that could be exploited when combined with SSH option injection via a crafted username
You are affected if your installed gitoxide version is below the patched releases AND your application uses untrusted clone URLs in an environment where the working directory could contain attacker-controlled files.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade gitoxide to version 0.35.0, 0.42.0, or 0.62.0 or later to obtain the patched version. Avoid using untrusted clone URLs in applications whose working directories may contain attacker-controlled files.
gitoxide >= 0.62.0 (or gix-transport >= 0.62.0)
- Update the gitoxide crate dependency in your project's Cargo.toml to version 0.62.0 or later (e.g., gix-transport = "0.62.0" or gitoxide = "0.62.0")
- Run `cargo update` or `cargo build` to fetch the patched version
- Verify the update by running `cargo tree` to confirm the installed version includes the fix for CVE-2024-32884
- Rebuild and test your application to ensure the upgrade does not break existing functionality
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing5.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,752.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-32884 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-32884 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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