CVE-2024-3387
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA weak (low bit strength) device certificate in Palo Alto Networks Panorama software enables an attacker to perform a meddler-in-the-middle (MitM) attack to capture encrypted traffic between the Panorama management server and the firewalls it manages. With sufficient computing resources, the attacker could break encrypted communication and expose sensitive information that is shared between the management server and the firewalls.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidencePalo Alto Networks Panorama uses a weak device certificate with insufficient key bit strength for SSL/TLS connections between the Panorama management server and managed firewalls. This cryptographic weakness allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to intercept and potentially decrypt sensitive management traffic with sufficient computational resources.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 10.1.0, < 10.1.12>= 10.2.0, < 10.2.7>= 11.0.0, < 11.0.4= 10.2.7CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the device is PanoramaAccess the Panorama management console and navigate to Dashboard > Device Information. Confirm the device type shows as Panorama rather than a standalone firewall.Affected if The device is running Panorama software
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Check the Panorama software versionIn the Panorama console, go to Dashboard > Device Information and note the software version (e.g., 10.2.5). Compare this version against the affected ranges: 10.1.0 to 10.1.11, 10.2.0 to 10.2.6, 10.2.7, and 11.0.0 to 11.0.3.Affected if The installed version falls within any of the affected ranges
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Inspect the device certificate key strengthIn Panorama, navigate to Device > Certificate Management > Certificates. Locate the device certificate used for SSL/TLS between Panorama and managed devices. Check the key type and bit length. For RSA certificates, look for key sizes less than 2048 bits.Affected if The device certificate uses RSA keys with fewer than 2048 bits or uses another algorithm with equivalent weak key strength
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Verify management interface exposureCheck the network configuration to determine if the Panorama management interface (usually port 443 for web UI) is accessible from untrusted networks. Review firewall policies and NAT rules controlling access to the Panorama management IP address.Affected if The Panorama management interface is exposed to untrusted or public networks without proper access controls
A user is affected if their Panorama version is within the listed ranges AND their device certificate uses weak key strength (less than 2048-bit RSA or equivalent) AND the management interface is network-accessible to potential attackers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped10.1.1210.2.711.0.4
Apply the vendor patch when released and regenerate/replace the device certificate with a cryptographically strong certificate (minimum 2048-bit RSA or equivalent). Ensure Panorama management interface is not exposed to untrusted networks.
Panorama 10.1.12, 10.2.7, or 11.0.4 (depending on your current major version branch)
- 1. Log in to the Panorama management server via CLI or web interface
- 2. Verify the current Panorama software version using 'show system info' command
- 3. Download the appropriate fixed Panorama software image (10.1.12, 10.2.7, or 11.0.4) from the Palo Alto Networks Customer Support Portal
- 4. Upload the software upgrade to Panorama: For CLI, use 'request system software upload <filename>' or use the web interface under Device > Software
- 5. Install the upgrade: For CLI, use 'request system software install <filename>' or via web interface
- 6. After installation, reboot Panorama to load the new version: 'request system restart'
- 7. After reboot, verify the new version is running with 'show system info'
- 8. Regenerate device certificates on Panorama: Go to Device > Certificates > Device Certificates and create new certificates with strong key strength (minimum 2048-bit RSA or ECC)
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-3387 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-3387 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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