CVE-2024-34046
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe O-RAN E2T I-Release Prometheus metric Increment function can crash in sctpThread.cpp for message.peerInfo->sctpParams->e2tCounters[IN_SUCC][MSG_COUNTER][ProcedureCode_id_RICsubscription]->Increment().
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the O-RAN E2T I-Release Prometheus metric Increment function in sctpThread.cpp. The code crashes when attempting to increment the counter at e2tCounters[IN_SUCC][MSG_COUNTER][ProcedureCode_id_RICsubscription]->Increment(), likely due to missing bounds validation or uninitialized array structures allowing out-of-bounds or null pointer access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify O-RAN E2T installationSearch for O-RAN E2T or sctpThread.cpp files in the system. Common locations include /opt/oran, /usr/local/oran, or project directories containing O-RAN source code.Affected if O-RAN E2T software or source code is present on the system
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Locate the vulnerable source fileSearch for sctpThread.cpp in the O-RAN installation directory or source tree. Verify the file contains the e2tCounters array and the Increment() call at ProcedureCode_id_RICsubscription.Affected if The file sctpThread.cpp with the vulnerable code pattern is found
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Determine software versionCheck for version information in the O-RAN E2T component - look for version files, git tags, or binary metadata. Compare against any released version numbers for the O-RAN software.Affected if The installed version is an unpatched release that contains the vulnerable code in sctpThread.cpp
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Check for RIC subscription featureInspect configuration files or logs to determine if RIC subscription functionality (ProcedureCode_id_RICsubscription) is enabled or can be triggered in the deployment.Affected if RIC subscription feature is enabled and can trigger message processing through the vulnerable code path
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Verify counter array initializationExamine the e2tCounters array initialization code in the codebase. Check if all three dimensions (IN_SUCC, MSG_COUNTER, ProcedureCode_id_RICsubscription) are properly initialized before use.Affected if The e2tCounters array is not fully initialized or lacks proper bounds checking before the Increment() call
A system is affected if it runs O-RAN E2T software containing the vulnerable sctpThread.cpp code where the e2tCounters array access lacks proper bounds validation and RIC subscription messaging can be processed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAdd proper bounds checking to validate the ProcedureCode_id_RICsubscription index before array access, and ensure e2tCounters arrays are fully initialized before use. Alternatively, implement null-pointer guards around the Increment() call.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-34046 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-34046 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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