CVE-2024-3544
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnauthenticated attackers can perform actions, using SSH private keys, by knowing the IP address and having access to the same network of one of the machines in the HA or Cluster group. This vulnerability has been closed by enhancing LoadMaster partner communications to require a shared secret that must be exchanged between the partners before communication can proceed.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Kemp LoadMaster's High Availability (HA) or Cluster group communications. Unauthenticated attackers on the same network segment as a LoadMaster node can perform actions by leveraging SSH private keys without proper credential exchange between HA/Cluster partners. The fix requires a shared secret to be exchanged between partners before inter-node communication is allowed.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 7.2.48.11>= 7.2.49.0, < 7.2.54.10>= 7.2.55.0, < 7.2.59.4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify LoadMaster installation versionAccess the LoadMaster web UI (typically https://<loadmaster-ip>) and navigate to System Configuration > System Administration > Updates & Licensing, or use the command line and run 'lmutil lmversion' or check /var/log/hostinfo for the version string.Affected if The installed version falls within any of these ranges: < 7.2.48.11; >= 7.2.49.0 and < 7.2.54.10; >= 7.2.55.0 and < 7.2.59.4.
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Confirm HA or Cluster feature is enabledIn the LoadMaster web UI, check under Virtual Services > High Availability or System Configuration > Cluster Operations. Alternatively, check for the presence of HA/Cluster partner IPs in the configuration using 'lmutil' or reviewing the stored configuration files.Affected if The LoadMaster has HA partners configured or is part of a Cluster group, making inter-node communication active.
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Verify shared secret is configured between partnersIn the LoadMaster web UI, navigate to System Configuration > System Administration > Security Options > HA/Cluster Shared Secret. Check if a shared secret has been defined and applied to all partner nodes. This can also be checked via the API or CLI if available.Affected if No shared secret is configured or the shared secret is not properly exchanged between all HA/Cluster partners.
You are affected if your LoadMaster version is in the vulnerable range AND HA/Cluster features are enabled WITHOUT a properly configured shared secret between all partner nodes.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped7.2.48.117.2.54.107.2.59.4
Apply the vendor patch/upgrade and configure the required shared secret between all HA/Cluster partner nodes to secure inter-partner communications. Ensure network segmentation to limit exposure of HA/Cluster management interfaces.
7.2.59.4 or later (latest 7.2.x release)
- 1. Identify the current LoadMaster version via the web management interface (Help > About) or CLI (lmutil --ver)
- 2. Determine which version branch you are currently on (7.2.48.x, 7.2.49.x-7.2.54.x, or 7.2.55.x-7.2.59.x)
- 3. For version < 7.2.48.11: Upgrade to 7.2.48.11 or later in the 7.2.48.x line
- 4. For version >= 7.2.49.0 and < 7.2.54.10: Upgrade to 7.2.54.10 or later in the 7.2.54.x line
- 5. For version >= 7.2.55.0 and < 7.2.59.4: Upgrade to 7.2.59.4 or later in the 7.2.59.x line
- 6. Download the upgrade from Kemp Technologies support portal (support.kemptechnologies.com) using valid support credentials
- 7. Apply the upgrade via LoadMaster web interface (System Configuration > System Upgrade > Upgrade LoadMaster) or CLI
- 8. After upgrade, verify HA/Cluster partner communication is working correctly with the new shared secret mechanism
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-3544 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-3544 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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