Mirror RegistryApplication · Redhat

CVE-2024-3622

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2024-04-25
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
94/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A flaw was found when using mirror-registry to install Quay. It uses a default secret, which is stored in plain-text format in one of the configuration template files. This issue may lead to all instances of Quay deployed using mirror-registry to have the same secret key. This flaw allows a malicious actor to craft session cookies and as a consequence, it may lead to gaining access to the affected Quay instance.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

The mirror-registry tool for Red Hat Quay contains a hardcoded default secret stored in plain-text within a configuration template file. This causes all Quay instances deployed via mirror-registry to share the same secret key, enabling attackers to craft valid session cookies and gain unauthorized access to affected instances.

MitigationReplace the default hardcoded secret with a unique, randomly generated secret in the configuration template, and regenerate all existing session tokens after applying the fix.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Mirror RegistryApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if Red Hat Quay was deployed using mirror-registry
    Review deployment documentation or check for mirror-registry installation artifacts such as /etc/quay/mirror-registry or the presence of the mirror-registry binary in the system.
    Affected if Quay was deployed using the mirror-registry tool
  2. Locate the configuration template containing the secret
    Find the Quay configuration file, typically config.yaml in /etc/quay or the config bundle created during mirror-registry setup. The hardcoded secret is stored within a configuration template file used by mirror-registry.
    Affected if The configuration file exists and was generated by mirror-registry
  3. Extract and inspect the session secret value
    Open the configuration file and locate the SESSION_SECRET or analogous secret key field. View its plain-text value.
    Affected if A session secret key is present in plain text within the config
  4. Compare the secret against the default hardcoded value
    Check if the extracted secret matches the known default hardcoded value that ships with mirror-registry. If the secret was never explicitly changed during deployment, it will be the default.
    Affected if The secret has not been changed from the default value that mirror-registry ships with
  5. Verify if active session tokens could have been forged
    Determine if the default secret is still in use. Any session cookies created while the default secret was active could potentially be forged by anyone possessing that secret.
    Affected if The default secret was or is currently in use for generating session cookies

The environment is affected if Quay was deployed via mirror-registry and the session secret has not been replaced with a unique value from the default hardcoded secret.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace the default hardcoded secret with a unique, randomly generated secret in the configuration template, and regenerate all existing session tokens after applying the fix.

Fix this in Mirror Registry Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,800
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-3622 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data