CVE-2024-36435
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered on Supermicro BMC firmware in select X11, X12, H12, B12, X13, H13, and B13 motherboards (and CMM6 modules). An unauthenticated user can post crafted data to the interface that triggers a stack buffer overflow, and may lead to arbitrary remote code execution on a BMC.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA stack buffer overflow vulnerability in Supermicro BMC firmware on select X11, X12, H12, B12, X13, H13, and B13 motherboards (and CMM6 modules) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by sending specially crafted data to the web interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Supermicro motherboard or module modelAccess the BMC web interface and check the system information page, or use IPMI command: `ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U admin -P admin chassis status` to retrieve the system product nameAffected if The model is one of the X11, X12, H12, B12, X13, H13, B13 series motherboards or a CMM6 module
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Check the installed BMC firmware versionIn the BMC web interface, navigate to the Firmware Information or Maintenance section and record the BMC firmware version. Alternatively, use IPMI: `ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U admin -P admin raw` or check the firmware revision in the BIOS/UEFI setup under BMC settingsAffected if The BMC firmware version is older than the latest version available from Supermicro for your specific model; no patched version is available in unpatched environments
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Determine if the BMC web interface is network accessibleVerify whether TCP port 443 (HTTPS) or port 80 (HTTP) on the BMC IP address is reachable from untrusted networks. Use a network scan or test connectivity: `telnet <BMC_IP> 443` or `nmap -p 443 <BMC_IP>`Affected if The BMC web interface is exposed to networks that are not trusted or are directly internet-accessible
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Review BMC access logs for suspicious web requestsIn the BMC web interface, access the Logs or Event Log section and look for unexpected POST requests to web endpoints, especially those with unusually large payload sizes or encoded data, around the time of potential exploitationAffected if There are anomalous web interface requests, particularly large or malformed HTTP POST data, that were not initiated by legitimate administrators
The environment is likely affected if it uses a Supermicro X11/X12/H12/B12/X13/H13/B13 motherboard or CMM6 module with BMC firmware that has not been updated to a patched version, and the BMC web interface is network-accessible to untrusted parties.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate BMC firmware to the latest version when available; if no patch exists, restrict network access to the BMC management interface to reduce exposure.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-36435 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-36435 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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